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One of the numerous constitutional questions about which the
Constitution itself tells us very little is the extent to which persons who
are not soldiers or sailors on active duty may be subjected to trial by
court-martial. Clause 14 of article 1, section 8, says that Congress
may "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces;" clause 18 adds that Congress may "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper" to that end. The fifth amendment
exempts from its requirement of grand jury indictment "cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger." The rest is silence.
But if the Constitution itself is laconic, or even cryptic, the
Supreme Court has in recent years told us a good deal more. Since
1955 the Court has held, without qualifying hedges or ambiguities,
that Congress cannot constitutionally authorize a court-martial to try
in time of peace, for any offense, any person who is a "civilian." In
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,1 it held that a court-martial
t Professor of Law, Yale University; Lieutenant Colonel, JAGC, USAR A.B.
1936, Dartmouth College; LL.B. 1940, Harvard University. Member, D.C. Bar.
1350 U.S. 11 (1955). The case held unconstitutional application of Article 3(a)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 803(a) (1958), to an honorably
discharged soldier who had not retained or reacquired any connection with the military.
It should be observed that article 3(a) jurisdiction was thrust upon the army over
the strong objection of its Judge Advocate General, who correctly foresaw the
Supreme Court's attitude. See Hearings on S. 857 and H.R. 4080 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed SerAces, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 256-57

(1949).

Hereinafter citations to the Uniform Code of Military Justice will be made solely
by article number. Its complete provisions are set forth in 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940

(1958).
(317)
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cannot try a discharged soldier, who has wholly severed his connection
with the armed forces, for an offense committed while he was subject
to military jurisdiction. The line of cases starting with Reid v.
Covert2 held that a court-martial cannot in peacetime try civilians,
whether employees or dependents of military personnel, who accompany or serve with the armed forces overseas, for any offense whatsoever, whether capital or noncapital. But it is a commonplace of constitutional law that whenever one question is settled, another springs
up to take its place. It is now clear that civilians cannot in peacetime
be court-martialed; but who is a civilian, and how does a court tell
one when it sees him? Among the people whom Congress, by Article
2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, has purported to subject to
military jurisdiction, are several categories whose proper classification
may puzzle the courts. They are certainly not obvious members of
the armed forces, as are soldiers on active duty; on the other hand
they are not "full-fledged" civilians. Three of these categories-retired
regulars, certain reservists, and military prisoners with executed dishonorable or bad-conduct discharges-present the problem of classification 8 in acute form. It may be that the questions raised by them
and their trespasses cannot be answered simply by reading the opinions
(majority, plurality, and concurring) in Toth, Covert, et al., and then,
with the wisdom thereby acquired, examining the individual to see
whether, on balance, he resembles a civilian more than he does a
soldier. Does he always wear a fedora, or may he on occasion wear
the cap, garrison? Is his underwear purchased from Macy's or the
Quartermaster? Is his pay check, if any, signed by the Finance
Officer? These tests may be significant, but they do not, somehow,
seem decisive. Perhaps there are other relevant factors, such as the
offense charged and the punishment inflicted, for these, too, may be
essentially civilian or essentially military. In short, examination
should be made of the necessities and nature of the present military
2354 U.S. 1 (1957). Following Covert were: Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) ; Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) ; McElroy
v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). See generally Girard, The
Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces-A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 13 STAN. L. RF-v. 461 (1961). These cases held unconstitutional
article 2(11) of the Uniform Code.
3 Article 2(1) covers, inter alia, reservists ordered to active duty who have failed
to enter upon such duty; 2(4), retired regulars entitled to receive pay; 2(6), members of the Navy's Fleet and Marine Corps Reserves; and 2(7), dishonorably discharged prisoners in military custody. Other groups might, in theory, raise the
question, but the military authorities have not attempted to try them, and are not
likely to do so. These include reservists on inactive duty training, article 2(3),
retired reservists receiving hospitalization from the armed forces, article 2(5), and
certain civilian employees of the Government when assigned to and serving with the
armed forces, article 2(8).
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establishment, and of the long history of military jurisdiction over
persons and offenses not purely military.
I. HISTORICAL VIEW OF COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
The common law, and the Anglo-American polity in general, have
for some centuries been marked by a peculiar, but very natural,
ambivalence toward the military. On the one hand, a standing army
is a standing menance to republican institutions and civil freedom.
English and American statesmen of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries had not far to look in time or space to find examples of that
proposition.
[T]he liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs, and . . . the liberties of Europe, as far as

they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price
of her military establishments. A standing force, therefore,
is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary,
provision. On the smallest scale, it has its inconveniences.
On an extensive scale, its consequences may be fatal. On
any scale, it is an object of laudable circumspection and
precaution. 4
On the other hand, there imdoubtedly were (and are) times when the
presence of large, well-trained, well-equipped, and well-disciplined
armed forces is intensely comforting.
The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent
of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty
and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the
signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation, which used to
mark the progress of war, prior to their introduction.'
The dilemma is most acute when the military asserts some degree
of control over civilians, specifically when military tribunals exercise
criminal jurisdiction over persons who are not soldiers. It is selfevident that such jurisdiction, however necessary it may sometimes
seem, is pro tanto a supersession of, and an encroachment upon, civilian
government, without (in the circumstances here considered) the
excuse of war or other emergency. In addition, the major purpose of
military justice has always been deterrence.6 It has traditionally
4 THE FEDERALIST

No. 41 (Madison).

5 THE FEDERALIST No. 8 (Hamilton).
6 See, e.g., the testimony of Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener, who won Covert

and other cases cited in note 2 supra, and who may be described as the contemporary
equivalent of Colonel Winthrop as an experton military.law and.its history, in Hear-
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placed primary emphasis on the swift and severe suppression of license
and insubordination. The pious doctrine that it is better that ninetynine guilty men go free than that one innocent be convicted is not
easily squared with the demands of military discipline. If a soldier
who runs away is shot, in Voltaire's expressive phrase, "pour encourager les autres," the heartening effect is sadly diminished if
ninety-nine out of a hundred deserters get away. The result of this
difference in objectives and approach, as seen by Mr. Justice Black, a
frequent and articulate spokesman for those who are opposed to any
expansion of military jurisdiction, is that "traditionally, military
justice has been a rough form of justice, emphasizing summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern penalties .

.

.

."

Therefore,

he concludes, "military tribunals have not been and probably never
can be constituted in such way that they can have the same kind of
qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials
of civilians in federal courts." 8 This jaundiced view of courts-martial
is, of course, of some antiquity,' and until comparatively recent times
was pretty well supported by the facts."0 Justice Black's strictures
seem somewhat excessive, as he himself recognized, in the light of the
present-day Uniform Code of Military Justice. In theory, the Uniform Code confers on the accused in a court-martial most of the important constitutional rights, other than the grand and petit juries,
which he would have in a civilian criminal court." In practice, as
ings on S.857 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 140 (1949). Colonel Wiener reiterated these views in 1962.
See Hearingson ConstitutionalRights of Military PersonnelBefore the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 777 (1962). These hearings, which are a mine of information on the policies
and practices of the three services (though the mineral content of the ore is rather
low), are hereinafter referred to as Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military
Personnel.
7
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 35-36 (1955). Macaulay's
rhetoric is even better:
The machinery by which courts of law ascertain the guilt or innocence of
an accused citizen, is too slow and too intricate to be applied to an accused
soldier. For, of all the maladies incident to the body politic, military insubordination is that which requires the most prompt and drastic remedies ...
For the general safety, therefore, a summary jurisdiction of terrible extent
must, in camps, be entrusted to rude tribunals composed of men of the sword.
3 MACAULAY, HISTORY oF ENGLAND 35 (1874 ed.).
8
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, supra note 7, at 17.
9 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, CommENTAR Es *413.
'OE.g., Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883); Beets v. Hunter, 75 F.
Supp. 825 (D. Kan. 1948), rev'd, 180 F.2d 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963
(1950) ; Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947); see Mullally,
Military Justice: The Uniform Code in Action, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 1 n.4 (1953).
11The Code prohibits coerced confessions (art. 31), double jeopardy (art. 44),
and cruel or unusual punishments (art. 55) ; it gives the accused the right to be apprised
of the charges against him (art. 30(b)), to be represented by counsel of his choice
(art. 38), and to compulsory process to obtain witnesses (art. 46). -The principal
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interpreted and enforced by the boards of review and the Court
of Military Appeals, the Uniform Code may give him more assurance
of a fair trial than he would have in many civilian courts.12 But the
extent to which Congress or the Court of Military Appeals can change
the basic motivation and approach of military courts is questionable.
For example, although article 37 of the Uniform Code probably does
as much as Congress can do to eliminate command influence from
military justice, the total eradication of such pressure is in all likelihood impossible.: 3 Moreover, congressional devotion to due process
has not always stood up when Congressmen were alarmed by what
they regarded as a military emergency,'" and it is by no means inconceivable that some future Congress will see fit to relax the safeguards
which now attend court-martial proceedings under the Uniform Code.'5
If that happened, it is unclear to what extent the Bill of Rights would
give procedural protection to an accused, civilian or military, who was
lawfully subjected to the jurisdiction of a court-martial.' 6
The common law viewed military justice with such profound
suspicion that the lawful jurisdiction of courts-martial in peacetime
and in domestic territory, even over soldiers themselves and for purely
military offenses, dates from comparatively modem times.
The common law of England knew nothing of courts-martial,
and made no distinction, in time of peace, between a soldier
and any other subject; nor could the government then
[1685] venture to ask even the most loyal parliament for a
mutiny bill. A soldier, therefore, by knocking down his
colonel, incurred only the ordinary penalties of assault and
exception is the right to be admitted to bail, which would not usually be of much

practical use to a soldier. See United States ex rel. Watkins v. Vissering, 184 F.
Supp. 529 (E.D. Va. 1960); WINTHROP, Mn.rrARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 114 (2d

ed. 1920) [hereinafter cited as WINTHROP]. In general, it seems to be the policy
of the military authorities to limit pretrial confinement to the sort of case in which
a civil court would be likely to deny bail or set it at a prohibitive figure. See Hearings on, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel 847; cf. United States v. Gray,
6 U.S.C.M.A. 615, 20 C.M.R. 331 (1956).
12See United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951); Wiener,
Courts-Martialad the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 H~Av. L. REv. 266,
302 (1958).
'3 For a list of horrible examples, see Hearings on ConstitutionalRights of Military Personnel 780-81. Each of these convictions was affirmed by the board of review and reversed by the Court of Military Appeals. There may well be similar
cases which never got to the Court of Military Appeals and others in which the command influence existed but could not be shown.
14 See, e.g., Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J.
489 (1945).
15 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
16 Ibid.; see Wiener, Courts-Martialand the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice (pts. 1-2), 72 HARv. L. REv. 1, 266 (1958) ; Henderson, Courts-Martial and the
Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1957); Bishop,
Civilian Judges and Military Jitstice: Collateral Review of Court-MartialConvictions,
61 Co um. L. REv. 40, 55-57 (1961).
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battery, and, by refusing to obey orders, by sleeping on
guard, or by deserting his colours, incurred no legal penalty
at all.y-7
In 1689, Parliament passed the original Mutiny Act '--an instructive
example of the schizoid motivations which are still at work. The
legislators were urged to action by the concatenation of an imminent
war on the continent, a serious mutiny of one regiment at home, and
the existence of other regiments which might not have completely
transferred their loyalty from James II to William of Orange. At
the same time, they were counseled to caution by recent and disagreeable memories of Cromwell's Major Generals and James II's standing
army. The act starts with an emphatic declaration that "the raising
or keeping a standing Army within this Kingdome in time of peace
unlesse it be with consent of Parlyament is against Law." " But,
it is judged necessary by Their Majestyes and this present
Parliament That dureing this time of Danger severall of the
Forces which are now on foote should be continued and
others raised for the Safety of the Kingdome for the Common
Defence of the Protestant Religion and for the reduceing of
Ireland."°
The preamble continues:
And whereas noe Man may be forejudged of Life or
Limbe, or subjected to any kinde of punishment by Martiall
Law, or in any other manner than by the Judgement of his
Peeres, and according to the Knowne and Established Laws
of this Realme. Yet, neverthelesse, it being requisite for
retaineing such Forces as are or shall be raised dureing this
Exigence of Affaires in their Duty an exact Discipline be
observed. And that Soldiers who shall Mutiny or stirr up
Sedition, or shall desert Their Majestyes Service be brought
to a more Exemplary and speedy Punishment than the usuall
Forms of Law will allow ....

However exigent the needs of the military situation may have been,
the act gave courts-martial very limited jurisdiction. It applied only
17 1 MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 231 (1874 ed.).

The Tudor and Stuart

monarchs made sporadic efforts, which at least had the excuse of necessity, to promulgate military codes as an exercise of the crown's prerogative, the last of these
being the Articles of War of James II of 1688. With much less justification, they
sometimes subjected civilians to the jurisdiction of military tribunals. But the latter
practice was never legally sanctioned, was very much resented, and was finally declared
unlawful in the Petition of Right, 1627, 3 Car. 1, c. 1; see WINTHROP 18-19, 46-47;
FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 9 (2d ed. 1943).
is Mutiny Act, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 5.
19 Mutiny Act, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 5, preamble.
20 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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to soldiers, and indeed only to the regulars, since the Militia Forces
were exempted. The only offenses triable were mutiny, sedition, and
desertion. 2 On the other hand, the procedural protections which the
act accorded were somewhat primitive, even for that age. The courtmartial could not be convened by an officer below the rank of colonel
or have fewer than thirteen members, none below the rank of captain.
The court had the authority to put witnesses under oath, although
apparently it was not required to do so. In capital cases the court had
to be sworn, and the votes of nine of the thirteen were necessary for
the death sentence. It did confer on the accused one protection which
is not found in the Uniform Code, and hopefully is not needed: "noe
Proceedings, Tryall or Sentence of Death shall be had or given against
any Offender, but betweene the hours of eight in the morning and one
in the afternoone" --a reflection, probably sufficiently warranted, on
the drinking habits of the King's officers.
Since then Anglo-American legislatures, and particularly the
Congress of the United States, have steadily expanded the jurisdiction
of courts-martial over both persons and offenses without encountering,
until quite recently, any substantial judicial check. All of the American
Articles of War, from those adopted by the Continental Congress in
1775 down to the Uniform Code, covered various types of civilians
accompanying the armed forces in wartime or, after 1916, in peacetime outside the United States. 4 This jurisdiction never ran into
serious trouble in the lower courts.2 5
In the Civil War, Congress went further than it previously had
gone, and indeed a good deal further than it has gone since. 6 The
22It should, however, be noted that the first Mutiny Act did not limit the jurisdiction of the military, under the King's authority, to try and punish offenses com-

mitted by soldiers in places outside the jurisdiction of English civil courts. Later
Articles of War have applied equally to soldiers at home and abroad. See WiNTHROP 20.
23
Mutiny Act, 1689, 1 W. &M., c. 5, § 10.
24 See WInTROP 97-107; Girard, supra note 2, at 482-88, 495.
25
E.g., United States ex reL Mobley v. Handy, 176 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 904 (1949) ; Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.
1945), dismissed as moot sub norn. Perlstein v. Hiatt, 328 U.S. 822 (1946); Hines v.
Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645 (1919) ; Ex parte Jochen,
257 Fed. 200 (S.D. Tex. 1919) ; Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D.N.J. 1918) ; Ex
parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); Grewe v. France, 75 F. Supp. 433
(E.D. Wis. 1948); In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Ohio 1944); McCune v.
Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943) ; In re Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.
N.Y. 1943). All of these cases arose during World War I or II. Compare, however,
I; re Varney's Petition, 141 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Cal. 1956), which involved the courtmartial of a civilian employee in Japan after the Korean "police action.'
26 So did the President; there were, of course, many instances during and after
the rebellion in which military tribunals tried civilians without explicit congressional
authority. See Schaffter & Mathews, The Powers of the President as Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 443, 84th Cong.,
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Congress of 1862, presumably acting on the premise that civilian due
process was too good for the slippery and prehensile entrepreneurs who
were then supplying the Army of the United States with decayed beef,
shoddy pantaloons, and wornout muskets at extortionate prices,
provided that civilian contractors for arms, munitions, and supplies
should be "deemed and taken as a part of the land or naval forces
*

.

..

[they] shall contract to furnish said supplies
for which . .
. 2,
" There seem to have been a fair number of courts-martial

. ,

under this unique provision,2 8 but the question of its constitutionality
was apparently considered only once by a civilian court. Although
that case, Ex parte Henderson,29 was described by the plurality opinion
in Reid v. Covert 3'as holding that the subjection of contractors to
court-martial jurisdiction was "patently unconstitutional," this element
of Henderson seems to have been dictum. The case was actually decided on the implausible ground that the word "contractor" in the Act
of March 2, 1863,"' under which Henderson had been charged, was
intended to cover only persons who were in fact members of the
armed forces, such as "military storekeepers."
This same 1863 statute, however, inaugurated another variety
of peacetime jurisdiction over civilians which proved to have more
vitality. Aimed primarily at the military opposite numbers of dishonest contractors, it provided in substance that court-martial jurisdiction to try various frauds and larcenies against the United States
should survive the accused's discharge or dismissal from the service,
regardless of whether the offense could be tried in a civilian court. In
slightly varying forms, it remained a fixture in the Articles of War
and the Articles for the Government of the Navy 2 for nearly ninety
years. In 1950 it was replaced by article 3 (a) of the Uniform Code,
2d Sess. 4-5 (1956); WINTHROP 828-30; cf. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). But these were
essentially exercises of the Commander in Chief's war powers-"martial rule" in the
loyal states and "military government" in occupied parts of the Confederacy-and so
do not pose the constitutional problem with which this Article is concerned.
27ACt of July 17, 1862, ch. 200, § 16, 12 STAT. 594.
28 See WINTHROP 98 n.83.
29 11 Fed. Cas. 1067 (No. 6349) (C.C.D. Ky. 1878). The Henderson case was
not reported until 1878, but Colonel Winthrop says that it was decided in 1866, WINTHROP 106, and internal evidence in the opinion seems to confirm that it was written
shortly after the end of the war. The opinion of the Court of Claims in Hill v.
United States, 9 Ct Cl. 178 (1873), apparently assumed, although it did not consider,
the constitutionality of the provision.
30 354 U.S. 1, 20 (1957). Justice Black and his colleagues are not alone in treating
Henderson as a holding on the constitutional point. See WINTEROP 106; Blair, CourtMartial Jurisdiction Over Retired Regulars: An Unwarranted Extension of Military

Power, 50 GEo. L.J. 79, 83 (1961).
31 Ch. 67, 12 STAT. 696.
=Article of War 60, ch. 5, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) ; Article of War 94, ch. 227, 41
Stat 805 (1920) ; Article of War 94, ch. 625, § 237, 62 Stat. 640 (1948) ; Article for
the Government of the Navy 14, ch. 10, 12 Stat. 696 (1863).
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which, until it was partially paralyzed by Toth, preserved courtmartial jurisdiction over any crime committed before the offender was
released from subjection to military law-so long as it was punishable
by confinement of five years or more, the Code's statute of limitations
had not run, and the accused could not be tried in an American
civilian court. Courts-martial under this Civil War statute and its
successors were by no means rare, and the inferior federal courts
But most of the courts
almost always upheld their constitutionality.'
saw the issue as whether such scoundrels ought to be punished, without
focusing on the question whether appropriate punishment might not
have been inflicted with equal efficiency and more constitutionality by
a civilian tribunal. The solitary exception to the pre-Toth judicial
tolerance of courts-martial of these civilians was United States ex rel.
3 4 Aside from the fact that it was
Flannery v. Commanding General.
reversed by stipulation of the parties, 5 the opinion in Flannery is less
persuasive than it might have been. The decision rested mainly on
the technical ground that the sole basis for sustaining the constitutionality of the act was the fifth amendment's exception of "cases
arising in the land or naval forces" and that the word "case" as
employed therein meant not "event" but "prosecution"-an argument
which had been rejected three-quarters of a century before as "certainly a very finely drawn distinction." 3 6
The gradual extension of military jurisdiction over civilians was
paralleled by an extension of jurisdiction over offenses of an essentially civilian nature. Earlier articles, like the original Mutiny Act,
proceeded on the assumption that the business of a court-martial was
to try crimes martial-desertion, mutiny, cowardice, insubordination,
and the like-which were unknown to the common law and not
cognizable in its courts. In many instances, of course, the soldier who
committed an ordinary misdemeanor or felony simultaneously committed some breach of military discipline. Thus, when Sergeant
Mason, detailed to guard the assassin of President Garfield, attempted
to avenge his Commander in Chief by shooting the prisoner, he was
constitutionally tried and sentenced by a court-martial-not for at33
1n re Bogart, 3 Fed. Gas. 796 (No. 1596) (C.C.D. Cal. 1873) ; Kronberg v.
Hale, 180 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Marino v. Hildretb, 61 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.N.Y.
1945) ; Terry v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1933) ; EX parte Joly,
290 Fed. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).

34 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
3r Order No. 20235, United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, 2d
Cir., April 18, 1946.
361n re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. 796, 799 (No. 1596) (C.C.D. Cal. 1873). The majority of the Supreme Court sensibly avoided this sterile logomachy in the Toth case.
See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 n.5 (1955). Justice Reed's

dissent is heavily entangled in it. Id. at 37-42.
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tempted murder, but for disobeying orders.3 7 In time of war and
outside the United States, inability to punish those military felons who
managed to perpetrate outrages having no specifically military character presented serious problems. In the Mexican War, General
Scott, apparently in the capacity of military governor of occupied
territory, created military commissions with jurisdiction over anyone,
soldier or civilian, charged with "assassination, murder, poisoning,
rape," and a long list of other offenses, including most of the usual
civilian crimes. The list also included a few others, not so usual, such
as the "wanton desecration of churches" and "interruption of religious ceremonies," which conveys a suggestion that the protestant
zeal of some of his soldiers was plaguing General Scott at the time."
Not until the Civil War was in its third year, when Congress
passed the first draft law, were courts-martial given jurisdiction to
try soldiers for civilian crimes, and then only in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, and only for major felonies-murder, assault and
battery with intent to kill, manslaughter, mayhem, wounding with
intent to commit murder, robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault and
battery with intent to commit rape, and larceny. 9 These offenses, if
not distinctively military, were at least among those most likely to be
committed by the military, and had a direct and plain relation to
military discipline; their swift and severe repression was obviously as
much in the Army's interest as in that of the civilian population.
It is a matter well known that the march even of an army
not hostile, is often accompanied with acts of violence and
pillage by straggling parties of soldiers, which the most
rigid discipline is hardly able to prevent. The offenses mentioned are those of most common occurrence, and the swift
and summary justice of a military court was deemed necessary to restrain their commission. °
37 Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881).
Mason was convicted under the theneffective Article of War 66, which denounced "disorders and neglects . . . to the

prejudice of good order and military discipline .

.

.

."

Similarly, theft could be

punished under that general article if the victim was a fellow soldier or the Army
itself. See DIG. Op. ARMY J.A.G. 44 (3d ed. 1868). Generally speaking, the question
of whether an offense against a civilian affected military discipline was left to the
discretion of the military authorities. See WINTHROP 75. Prior to the Civil War,
at least, those authorities seem to have been reluctant to try a soldier for an essentially
civilian crime unless it had a genuine and substantial connection with military discipline.
See Hearings on ConstitutionalRights of Military Personnel 785.
38 See WINTHROP 832.
39 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 736. The section concluded by
providing that "the punishments for such offenses shall never be less than those inflicted by the laws of the state, territory, or district in which they may have been
committed." Still limited to time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, it appeared with
minor changes in its wording in Articles of War of 1874, Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 5,
art. 58, REv. STAT. § 1342 (1875).
4O Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878).
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The Articles of War of 1916,4 -followed by those of 1920,42 introduced
the concept of peacetime jurisdiction over ordinary felonies committed
by soldiers, but even those articles withheld from court-martial jurisdiction the trial of the capital crimes of murder or rape committed
within the United States.43 Court-martial jurisdiction over members
of the armed services was not made total, by the addition of power to
try murder and rape committed in the United States in peacetime, until
the enactment of the Uniform Code in 1950.
The Supreme Court's recent contraction of court-martial jurisdiction over civilian persons, summarized at the beginning of this
Article, has not yet generated any corresponding inclination in the
lower courts to apply similar constitutional reasoning to military jurisdiction over basically civilian offenses.4" The argument presented in
the few cases which have raised the issue 4 5 has not been that the power
to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces," in the light of the "necessary and proper" clause, imports
no more than power to punish those military offenses which cannot adequately be dealt with by the civilian courts-although the historical
evidence suggests that is what the founding fathers probably had in
mind, or at least that it was the military jurisdiction with which they
were familiar.48 Rather, these unimaginative briefs have been cast
in well-worn terms: the fifth amendment's exception from the grand
jury requirement of capital or infamous crimes "arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger" means that capital cases, at least, can be tried by
court-martial only "in time of war or public danger." The trouble
with this textual argument is, of course, that the Supreme Court long
ago held that the final clause limiting the exception applies only to the
41 Ch. 418, § 1342, 39 Stat. 650-70. These articles were largely the work of the
then Judge Advocate General of the Army, Major General Enoch H. Crowder. But
even General Crowder could see no excuse for a military trial of a capital offense,
in peacetime and in the United States. See Hearings on Constitutional Rights of
Military Personnel 778. The American Legion takes the position that the Code ought
to be amended to deprive the military of such jurisdiction in capital cases and to give
civilian courts priority of jurisdiction over "peacetime offenses of a civil nature"
committed within the United States. Id. at 425, 456.
42 Ch. 227, 41 Stat. 787.
43 Cf. Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959), holding that June 10, 1949, though
the country was still technically at war with Germany and Japan, was "time of peace,"
and that a court-martial could not try a soldier for a murder committed on that date.
Actually, Lee was a military convict, a former soldier with an executed dishonorable
discharge, but the Court's construction of "time of peace" made his status irrelevant.
See text accompanying note 49 infra.
44 It may be difficult to disentarigle such offenses from the breaches of military
discipline which are implicit in most of them.
45 See cases cited note 48 infra.
46 See Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another P~roblem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction,13 VAND. L. REv. 435, 441 (1960).
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militia 4 7 -and so the inferior courts have held in all the recent cases
in which the argument has been made." The Supreme Court has not
had to reconsider this construction of the fifth amendment or the more
fundamental question of the scope of Congress' power in this context.
But it is worth noting that, in strictly construing old Article of War
92, which forbade courts-martial for rape or murder in domestic
territory "in time of peace," to prohibit such trial when the state of
war was purely technical, the Court used language and cited cases,
such as Toth and Covert, which suggest strongly that the result might
have been the same even if the Congress of 1920, like that of 1950,
had unambiguously authorized such trials.4" Moreover, some of the
language employed by Mr. Justice Black in Toth suggests that he,
at least, thinks that much of the justification for trials by military
tribunals rests on their professional expertise concerning the specialized
problems of purely military crimes. 50 But more recently, he (and
Justice Douglas) concurred in Justice Clark's opinion in Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton,5 in which it is flatly stated that "the
power to 'make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces' bears no limitation as to offenses." 52 Neither does
it seem to bear, according to the majority, any limitation as to punish47Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 115 (1895) ; Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696,
701 (1881).
48 Owens v. Markley, 289 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1961); Burns v. Taylor, 274 F.2d
141 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied. 364 U.S. 837 (1960); Jennings v. Markley, 186
F. Supp. 611 (S.D. Ind. 1960); United States v. Schafer, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 83, 32
C.M.R_ 83 (1962); United States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962).
49 Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959). In Thompson v. Willingham, 217 F.
Supp. 901 (M.D. Pa. 1962), the attack of the petitioner (who was his own lawyer)
on a court-martial's jurisdiction to try him for murder in time of peace seems to have
been predicated on a careless reading of Lee v. Madigan, supra, as a decision under
the Uniform Code rather than on the constitutional question. At any rate, the court
assumed the constitutionality of the jurisdiction.
So See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955) : "It is true
that military personnel because of their training and experience may be especially
competent to try soldiers for infractions of military rules. Such training is no doubt
particularly important where an offense charged against a soldier is purely military,
such as disobedience of an order, leaving post. etc." See also Black and Douglas,
JJ., concurring in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958) ("military courts may try
soldiers and punish them for military offenses"). The converse was stated by Mr.
Justice Douglas in Lee v. Madigan, supra note 49: "Civil courts were, indeed, thought
to be better qualified than military tribunals to try nonmilitary offenses." Id. at 234.
These remarks, of course, were made in contexts in which the question of the constitutionality of court-martial jurisdiction over particular offenses (murder in Toth
and Lee, desertion in Trop) was not in issue. But they do throw some light on the
Black-Douglas conception of the raison d'tre of a court-martial. Colonel Wiener,
though he thought it "the part of wisdom to restrict the military jurisdiction to occasions that affect military discipline," could see no constitutional limitation on the
power of courts-martial to try soldiers for such offenses under the general article.
Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel 785-86.
51361 U.S. 234 (1960).
.52 Id. at 246.
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ment. In Reid v. Covert,5 3 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, concurring in the result, would go no further than to say courts-martial could
not try civilians for capital crimes. 54 They maintained that position
in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton; " their view in effect was
that it might be "necessary and proper" for the regulation of the land
and naval forces that Congress give to the military power to jail accompanying civilians, but not that there be committed to courts-martial
power to invoke the "awesome finality" of hanging them. The rest of
the Court could see no such distinction.
The Court's indifference, when considering the constitutionality
of trial by court-martial, to the nature either of the offense or of the
punishment to be inflicted is a corollary of the majority's preoccupation
with the status of the accused. The basic proposition that congressional power to authorize trial by court-martial is to be limited to
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed" 5' is seen as
requiring its restriction to the smallest possible number of persons.
Once it is established that the accused is a "member or part of the
armed forces," a court-martial can apparently be authorized to try
him for any offense, presumably including a violation of the antitrust
laws, and can be given the power to inflict upon him any punishment,
military or civilian. The "status" theme runs through all the cases
denying jurisdiction over civilians; its most forthright and uncompromising formulation is probably that of Justice Clark (a recent
catechumen, for he had dissented in Reid v. Covert) in the Singleton
case: "The test for jurisdiction . . . is one of status, namely, whether

the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person who can be
regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval Forces.' "57 And
again, "If civilian dependents are included in the term 'land and naval
Forces' at all, they are subject to the full power granted the Congress
therein to create capital as well as noncapital offenses." 58 Justice
Black deduces much the same conclusion from the text of the Constitution: "The Constitution does not say that Congress can regulate
'the land and naval Forces and all other persons whose regulation might
have some relationship to maintenance of the land and naval
Forces.' "59 The beautiful simplicity of this technique of exegesis is
63 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
5Id. at 41.
55 361 U.S. at 249 '(dissenting opinion).
5
6Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821), quoted in United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955).
57361 U.S. at 240-41, 246.
68 Id. at 246.
59 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30 (1957). See also United States ex rel. Toth v.

Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955).
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reminiscent of the Justices approach to other problems of constitu-

tional law.6"
This single-minded concentration on status did not receive the
approbation of all the Justices. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in
particular thought that the extent of Congress' power to regulate the
land and naval forces could only be determined in the light of the
"necessary and proper" clause. As the latter Justice phrased it in his
dissent (in which Justice Frankfurter joined) in Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton: 61
I think that drawing a line of demarcation between those who
are constitutionally subject to the Article I, § 8, cl. 14 power,
and those who are not, defies definition in terms of military
"status." I believe that the true issue on this aspect of all
such cases concerns the closeness or remoteness of the relationship between the person affected and the military
establishment. 2
The quoted sentences do not clearly suggest that factors other
than the closeness of the relationship may be relevant; they can be
read as proposing only a more flexible concept of "status," not much
different from the ideas of Justices Whittaker and Stewart, who
thought that because the relationship of a civilian employee to the
military is closer than that of a civilian dependent, and the need to
discipline him consequently greater, a court-martial could constitutionally try the former for any offense, and inflict any punishment
upon him, but that it could not try the latter at all. 3 Even Justice
Black's opinion for the plurality in Reid v. Covert displayed a cautious
awareness that there are many degrees of relationship to the armed
forces and that not everyone is clearly in or clearly out.
Even if it were possible, we need not attempt here to precisely
define the boundary between "civilians" and members of the
"land and naval Forces." We recognize that there might be
circumstances where a person could be "in" the armed
services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not
formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a
uniform."
60 See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960); Reich, Mr.
Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HAgv. L. Rxv. 673, 741 (1963).
61361 U.S. at 257 (1960). See also id. at 261 n.2 (Mr. Justice Whittaker concurring).
62 Id. at 257.
63Id. at 264-65.
64 354 U.S. at 22-23. Justice Black's hedge may have been intended to dispel any
implication that Congress could not constitutionally subject to court-martial a draftee
not actually inducted, as Congress had done in World War I. Cf. Selective Draft
Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) ; see Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 556 (1944) ;
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Such a test means merely that whoever gets too close to the
armed forces, whoever steps over the line separating those "in" from
those "out," is subject to the totality of military jurisdiction; whoever
remains on the other side of that line is wholly immune. If retired
regulars, or reservists, or dishonorably discharged prisoners, are, on
balance, "in" the land or naval forces, Congress can subject them to
court-martial for any offense, military or civilian, and to any valid
punishment, military or civilian. But Justices Harlan and Frankfurter did, after all, regard the nature of the offense-or, more precisely, the punishment-as crucial. "The view that we must hold that
non-military personnel abroad are subject to peacetime court-martial
jurisdiction either for all offenses, or for none at all, represents an
inexorable approach to constitutional adjudication to which I cannot
subscribe." "
This, then, is the historical and constitutional context in which
the lower courts must decide the amenability to court-martial jurisdiction of the categories of persons, neither simon-pure civilians nor
uniformed military personnel on active duty, whom Congress has
subjected to that jurisdiction.
II. COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION OVER RETIRED REGULARS

Article 2 (4) of the Uniform Code subjects to the Code, and therefore to trial by court-martial, "retired personnel of a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to receive pay."
The potential practical significance of the provision is great,
perhaps greater than Congress could have supposed in 1951. It has
been estimated, in the light of the huge Size of the peacetime regular
establishment, that there will be upwards of one million retired regulars, entitled to pay, in the not too distant future.66 Quite aside from
the possibility of other forms of punishment, forfeiture of retired pay
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23, 32 (1955)
Minton, JJ., dissenting).

(Reed, Burton, and

He may also have had in mind the cases, distinguished by

Justice Clark in Guiagliardo, holding that such classification-defying specimens as the
old Navy paymaster's clerks, who had no rank but wore uniforms, could constitutionally be tried by Navy courts. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361
U.S. 281, 284-85 (1960); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895); EX parte Reed,
100 U.S. 13 (1879).
65361 U.S. at 256.
66 See Blair, op. cit. supra note 30, at 81. The estimate seems plausible in the
light of the retirement figures furnished by the three services to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 1962. See Hearings on Constitutional Rights of
Military Personnel 827-29, 889-92, 927. Extrapolation from these statistics requires
a great deal of guesswork, for they cover only enlisted personnel in the fiscal years
1951-1961 and, moreover, do not distinguish between retired regulars, who are subject to the Code, and retired reservists, who are not. It is probable, however, thata
large majority of retired enlisted men served in the regulars. As of June 30, 1962,
there were more than 2,800,000 members of the armed services on active duty. See
D&'T DErENsE ANr. REP. 376, 378 (1962).
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pursuant to court-martial sentence would mean real disaster to most of
these people.
The constitutionality of such jurisdiction has, at any rate, whatever solidity derives from long congressional acquiescence, for the
amenability of retired regulars to court-martial, though unknown to
the founding fathers, is as old as the retired list itself, which was also
unknown to them.67 The concept of retirement dates from 1861, a
year in which the problem of debridement from the military corpus of
physically and mentally decrepit officers presented itself forcibly to
the attention of Congress. 8 For the next fifty-five years, although
the jurisdiction remained on the books,"9 few subjects seem to have
concerned Congress less than the constitutional rights of retired regulars-in large part, no doubt, because there were very few of them
by modem standards, 70 still fewer who engaged in conduct sufficiently
flagitious to call for criminal prosecution, and hardly any who were
actually court-martialed. In 1912, in fact, Major General Enoch H.
Crowder, then the Judge Advocate General of the Army and a believer in the expansion in all directions of the salutary effects of trial
by court-martial, persuaded Congress to augment the general article by
the addition of the clause "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the military service," precisely because most of the peccadilloes of
retired enlisted men might otherwise have to go unpunished, at least
by the military.71 At that time, it will be recalled, the common,
67 The Navy, however, in its brief in United States v. Hooper, in the Court of
Military Appeals, conceded-in this respect agreeing with the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense-that tradition was not in itself an adequate reason for the
preservation of such jurisdiction. See Brief for Appellee, United States v. Hooper,
9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958).
68Act of August 3, 1861, ch. 42, 12 Stat. 287. The primeval congressional provisions for retirement distinguished between those who were "wholly retired" (with
a year's pay) and who thereupon became pure civilians, not subject to the Articles
of War, and those who were merely retired from active service, retaining both their
entitlement to pay and their subjection to the Articles. See 29 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 397,
401-02 (1912); WINTHROP 746-47. The unwarranted connection between pay status
and subjection to the Articles of War is reflected in the present article 2(4) of the
Uniform Code, which applies only to those retired military personnel who are on the
payroll.
09 "Since August 3, 1861, there have been in effect at all times, without interruption, statutes which expressly subject to military law and trial by Court-Martial
retired officers of the regular components of the Armed Forces of the United States
who are entitled to receive pay." Hooper v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437, 442 (S.D.
Cal. 1958). In 1872, Judge Advocate General Holt expressed the view that "an
officer on the retired list, being as much a part of the Army as an officer on the active
list, would be subject to trial by general court-martial independently of the provision,
specifically so subjecting him, of section 1256, R.S." See DIG. OPs. ARmy J.A.G.
992 (1912).
70 The Army's retired list was for many years limited to 300. Act of July 15,
1870, ch. 294, § 5, 16 Stat 317; see Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 549 (1887).
By 1895 retired officers and enlisted men together aggregated only 1,562. See WINTHRoP 87.
71 Officers, of course, wer6 already chargeable with "conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gefitl6man."

1964]

MILITARY-CIVILIAN HYBRIDS

civilian variety of crime was not in peacetime within the reach of a
court-martial, and, although the article already denounced conduct
"to the prejudice of good order and military discipline," 2 the General
freely conceded that "the act of a man on the retired list, away from
the military post, cannot reasonably be said to affect military discipline." 73 It is difficult to see why the Army needed such jurisdiction if the conduct denounced had no effect on military discipline.
Nevertheless, General Crowder got his amendment,74 and the language
still occupies a prominent position in the general article (article 134 of
the' Uniform Code), where it has caused far more grief to the active
7
than the retired list. 5
In 1916, however, the problem of the court-martialing of retired
officers received attention at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. When
Congress in that year, as part of a comprehensive and badly needed
reorganization of the military establishment, revised the Articles of
War, a Senate rider eliminated this jurisdiction. Woodrow Wilson
took the omission o seriously that he vetoed the entire bill, 70 including
'the appropriations, with the result that Congress restored the missing
jurisdiction. That veto message 7' is probably the best, as it is certainly the most eloquent, statement of the case for subjecting retired
officers to the military code. It seems to contain a measure of genuine
Wilsonian rhetoric, though it was probably prepared by General
Crowder, himself no contemptible rhetorician. The President started
with the argument quod semper: officers on the retired list had always
been subject to the Articles of War. They were declared by statute
to be a part of the regular Army, were permitted to wear the uniform,
were subject to recall by the President in time of war or national
emergency, and were thus to be distinguished from "mere pensioners,
from whom no further military service is expected." All these
premises are still as true and have as much, or as little, relevance as
in 1916. Warming to his work, he continued:
They are, therefore, members of the Army, officers of the
United States, exemplars of discipline, and have in their
keeping the good name and the good spirit of the entire
Military Establishment before the world. Occupying such a
72 U.S. WAR DEP'T, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL

1446 (1917).

78 See Hearingson the Revisions of the Articles of War Before the House Com-

mittee on Military Affairs, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 83, 84-85 (1912).
74 Articles of War of 1916, cli. 418, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666.
75 See Hagan, The General Article-Elemental Confusion, Military L. Rev., Oct.
1960, p. 63.
76 H.T. 16460, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1916).
7753 Cong. Rec. 12844-45 (1916). It is quoted in extenso in United States v.
Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 643-45, 26 C.M.R. 417, 423-25 (1958).
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relation, their subjection to the rules and Articles of War and
to trial by general court-martial have always been regarded
as necessary, in order that the retired list might not become
a source of tendencies which would weaken the discipline
of the active land forces and impair that control over those
forces which the Constitution vests in the President."8
Here is obscure and ominous language: Is the reference to
"tendencies" intended to suggest that without court-martial control
the retired list may become a source of plots and conspiracies against
the Government and the democratic order, a hotbed of dreamers of
military coups d'itat and hopeful men on horseback? '9 Such fears
are not, of course, pure fantasy, as is convincingly demonstrated in the
histories of the Weimar Republic, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth French
Republics, and other polities too numerous to mention. But although
our own history is not devoid of former generals (and an ex-admiral
or so) who have rather easily been persuaded to see themselves as
saviors of the country, in our case all of them who amounted to anything have attempted or accomplished the salvation by resigning from
the military service and running for office in the usual way. Whatever
danger there may be in electing to high office former military men
is not likely to be alleviated by subjecting them to court-martial before
they reach that office. True, article 88 of the Uniform Code, which
subjects to punishment "any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress,
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the
Secretary of the Treasury, or the Governor or legislature of any State,
Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or
present," would, if strictly applied, considerably inhibit the ordinary
conduct of one afflicted with the itch for elective office."0 But it has
not in fact been so applied. For one thing, the article has not been
construed to cover polemics which express contempt of the subject in
his official capacity or of his official policies and conduct. Strong
language may be employed so long as it is not directed ad hominem:
Id. at 644, 26 C.M.R. at 424.
Colonel Wiener, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, put it this way: "I think what he [Wilson] had basically in mind was
some retired general popping off and saying he didn't like the President, the Commander in Chief's policies." Hearings on ConstitutionalRights of Military Personnel
78

79

788.

80 During the course of the Senate hearings on the Uniform Code the late Senator
Kefauver purported to be somewhat alarmed by the thought that General Eisenhower,
Admiral Nimitz, or other members of the retired list might be court-martialed for
"calling public officials what they really are." See Hearings on S. 87 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 330
(1949). Senator Saltonstall did not view the prospect with similar alarm. At that
time General Eisenhower was not known to be a Republican and was, indeed, regarded
in some circles as a likely candidate for the Democratic nomination in 1952.
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"Adverse criticism of one of the officials or groups named in the
article, in the course of a political discussion, even though emphatically expressed, if not personally contemptuous, may not be
charged as a violation of the article." s Moreover, President Lincoln
seems to have been the only beneficiary of whatever protection it
affords.'
It has, of course, no application to an officer who has
resigned from the service and would presumably be unconstitutional if
it purported to do so. Even if the man of destiny thinks to attain his
goals by inciting to riot in Oxford, Mississippi, or other violent means,
and is reluctant (in case the putsch fails) to abandon his pension by
resigning, it is doubtful that subjecting him to military jurisdiction
adds anything to the civilian law's protection against subversion and
sedition, except to the extent that it avoids local juries favorable to the
brand of sedition involved. The history of those countries in which
military subversion or sedition is a commonplace feature of the governmental process shows that the' real danger comes from those officers
who are very much in active service; the ex-general will not get very
far unless he has the support of the officers who actually control the
armed forces. If he has that support, he is not likely to be much deterred by the threat of being brought before a court-martial drawn from
their ranks-a fact thoroughly appreciated, for example, by President
DeGaulle.
President Wilson, had, however, other reasons, grounded not
merely upon solicitude for the national welfare, but upon concern for
the retired officers themselves. After adverting to "the wholesome
and unifying effect of . .

.

subjection to a common discipline," he

said:
I am persuaded that officers upon the retired list would
themselves regard as an invidious and unpalatable discrimination which in effect excluded them from full membership in the profession to which they have devoted their lives,
and of which by the laws of their country they are still
members.83
The syntax is execrable, but the meaning is clear and perhaps not
altogether without psychological validity. The estimable old gentlemen
who constitute the retired list undoubtedly cherish their military status,
and some of them may feel (if they stop to think about it) that subs' See U.S. DEP'T oF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR CoURTs-MARTIAL 167 (1951).
82 SeeWINTHROP 565-66. Quoting Colonel Wiener again, "I know there is one
retired BG [Brigadier General] who always pops off, the committee knows about him.
He will never be tried because there is some question as to whether he has got all
his marbles, I don't mean he is committable, but he is a crackpot, so why bother with

him?" Hearings o; Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel 789.
83 53 Cong. Rec. 12844-45 (1916)

quoted in United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.

C.M.A. 637, 644, 26 C.M.R. 417, 424 (1958).
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jection to the military code, no less than the right to wear the uniform
and print their rank upon their calling cards, is one of the essential
distinctions between them and a civilian population to which they do
not wish to be completely homologized. One is reminded of the
famous episode in which Caesar scotched a mutiny in the Tenth
Legion, by addressing the soldiers as "Quirites" (a term which is
usually translated as "citizens," though its actual meaning seems more
closely approximated by "voters"), a shocking expedient which instantly recalled them to their duty. 4 But it is probable that the comfort retired officers derive from subjection to military jurisdiction
evaporates rather rapidly when that jurisdiction is actually invoked.
It must be borne in mind that in the case of offenses which are not
purely military, it represents an additional, rather than an exclusive,
possibility of punishment. The jurisdiction of courts-martial over such
offenses is of course concurrent with that of civilian courts,"5 and trial by
court-marial is compatible with trial by a state court, and vice versa, 6
under the familiar principle that the prohibition against double jeopardy
does not bar a second trial by a different sovereign."7 President
Wilson's psychology certainly lacks experimental verification, for those
retired officers who have in recent years been court-martialed seem to
have derived very little satisfaction from the experience; their challenges to the jurisdiction indicate strongly that they found it both
invidious and unpalatable.
Wilson's final argument was a suggestion that it might actually
be unconstitutional to relieve retired officers from amenability to the
Articles of War:
So long as Congress sees fit to make the retired personnel a part of the Army of the United States, the constitutionality of the proposed exemption of such personnel
from all liability under the Articles of War is a matter of
See also SUE844 M mmsEN, HISTORY OF ROME 527 (Dickson transl. 1871).
TONIUS, THE LIVEs OF THE TwELvE CAEsARs 39 (Modern Library ed. 1931).
85
E.g., Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920); Peek v. United States, 321
F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Kennedy v. Sanford, 166 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
333 U.S. 864 (1948); Thompson v. Willingham, 217 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
S6 Article 44(a) of the Uniform Code, which provides that "no person may, without his consent, be tried a second time for the same offense," is not construed to bar
a court-martial after a state trial based on the same act. See U.S. DEP'T oF DEFENsE,
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTLAL f 68d (1951). In practice, there is in all three services
as a matter of policy a presumption (less strong in the Navy than in the Army or
Air Force) against court-martial for an offense which has already been tried by a
civilian court. See Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel 874,
909, 961.
87 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); cf. Grafton v. United States,
206 U.S. 333 (1907). Of course, a state's own constitution or statute may treat as

former jeopardy a trial by a court-martial or other tribunal operating under federal
sovereignty. E.g., State ex rel. Cobb v. Mills, 82 Okla. Crim. 155, 163 P.2d 558
(1945).
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serious doubt, leaving the President, as it does, without any
means sanctioned by statute of exercising over the personnel
thus exempted the power of command vested in him by the
Constitution. 8
The argument, although interesting and original, does not carry complete conviction, for it goes far beyond the usual concept that "a law
repugnant to the constitution is void" 89 and indeed seems to suggest
that Congress is under a constitutional obligation to pass some laws.
But it fails to say how that obligation is to be enforced-unless its
import is that the President, as Commander in Chief and as a necessary
corollary to his power of command, may subject to court-martial any
member of the armed forces, with or without congressional sanctiona proposition which brings us all the way back to James II. It may
be true that courts-martial "are in fact simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and
navy and enforcing discipline therein," 90 but this is far from saying
that the Constitution permits the President, as well as Congress, "To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces," any more than he can "raise and support Armies" or "provide
and maintain a Navy." Nor does it seem to be true, in the light of
the recent Supreme Court decisions already discussed, that Congress
can make a civilian a member of the land or naval forces, constitutionally subject to military jurisdiction, simply by so labelling him. In
fact, about the only command which the President would have occasion
to issue to a retired officer is an order, when authorized by statute, to
return to active duty. The enforcement of such an order would hardly
require comprehensive court-martial jurisdiction over an officer on the
retired list, for the order would ipso facto restore him to active duty
status and constitutionally subject him to the Articles of War, just as
a draftee could constitutionally be made a member of the armed forces,
triable by court-martial, from the moment he is ordered to report for
induction, regardless of whether he actually shows up and takes the
oath.91 In short, President Wilson's constitutional point need not be
taken very seriously.
88 53 Cong. Rec. 12844-45 (1916) quoted in United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.
M.A. 637, 644, 26 C.M.R. 417, 424 (1958).

89 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 60 (1803).
90
WNTH oP 49. (Emphasis deleted.) See also Morgan, The Existing CourtMartial System and the Ansell Army Articles, 29 YALE L.J. 52, 66 (1919).
1 See note 64 supra. Article 2(1) of the Uniform Code, though it no longer
covers draftees before their actual induction, subjects to military jurisdiction "other
persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed
forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order to

obey it." Cf. In re La Plata's Petition, 174 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1959).
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Whatever the merits of his supporting arguments, Wilson's veto
stuck, and Congress has not since visibly troubled itself with the
problem. In the congressional hearings on the Uniform Code, the
Judge Advocate General of the Army, although he discussed at some
length and criticized acutely the proposed jurisdiction over reservists
on inactive duty training and discharged soldiers, said nothing at all
about retired personnel. 2 The House and Senate Committees disposed of the problem with the terse and unilluminating statement that
"paragraph (4) retains existing jurisdiction over retired personnel of
a Regular component who are entitled to receive pay." 9
This Congressional indifference is doubtless in large part attributable to the seeming unimportance of the question. Despite
President Wilson's dark forebodings, the policy of the services had
for many years been to leave to the civilian authorities retired officers
who misbehaved themselves.
The Army's views on the matter seem to have solidified after the
case of Major Kearney. 4 That officer, though he was undoubtedly
retired and presumably in receipt of pay, 5 was not an "exemplar of
discipline"; if his sins were not as scarlet they were at least of a rich
wine red, for the Major was a souse. His active career contained
several unfortunate episodes (including a court-martial which shortly
preceded his retirement), and a life of leisure did nothing to change his
notions of recreation. One night in San Francisco he was arrested
on the complaint of a hotel clerk, apparently for being excessively
drunk and having an unauthorized lady in his room. The civilian
authorities, having arrested him, let him go and took no further
measures. But the sensibilities of the military authorities were far
more outraged, though the offense did not, I trust, bear a particularly
military character. In almost no time the poor Major was hauled
before a general court-martial, charged with violation of Article of
War 95 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) in that he
was drunk and disorderly "to the disgrace of the military service."
He was convicted and sentenced to be dismissed from the service. The
9

2 Hearingson S. 857 and H.R. 4080 Before a Subcommittee of Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1949). See note 1 supra.
93 H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1949); S. REP. No. 486, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949).
94 3 J.A.G.D. Board of Review 63 (1931).
95 He had been retired under § 24b of the Reorganization Act of June 4, 1920,
ch. 227, § 24b, 41 Stat. 773, which provided that all Army officers should be arranged
in two classes: Class A, to be retained in the service, and Class B, not to be retained.
A second board then determined whether a Class B officer's classification was due
to his own "neglect, misconduct or avoidable habits." If so, he was discharged outright; if not, he was retired with pay. See Rogers v. United States, 270 U.S. 154
(1926) ; United States ex: rel. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922). Apparently
the Class B board had been merciful to Major Kearney.
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Board of Review, though it found with incomprehensible subtlety that
the evidence supported only conviction of the lesser included offense of
"conduct of a nature to bring discredit on the service" in violation of
the 96th article, affirmed the sentence. The Judge Advocate General
on the same day recommended confirmation, being "convinced .
that the accused is an undesirable type, unfitted to be carried on the
rolls of the Army." But the letter with which the Secretary of War
transmitted the record to the President expressed other views. Though
they appeared over the signature of the Honorable Patrick Jay Hurley,
who held that post in Hoover's cabinet,96 they are nonetheless cogent
and deserving of quotation:
I . . . disagree entirely with the fundamental basis of
the trial. To my mind it establishes one of the most dangerous precedents that has confronted the Army in its many
years of jurisprudence. It, in effect, extends the general
court-martial system to retired officers to practically the same
extent that it does to active officers and to the practical exclusion of the civil police powers. 7 It has been the immutable
custom of the service that officers when retired, unless some
extraordinary circumstances were involved linking them to
the military establishment or involving them in conduct
inimical to the welfare of the nation, would be subject only
to the same police restrictions and jurisprudential processes
as the ordinary civilian.
In the present instance the accused, an officer on the retired list, not in uniform or in any way connected with the
military establishment, was drunk in his hotel room. [He
was arrested, but] . . . he was not brought to trial by the
civil authorities. The military authorities, however, then
proceeded to apply the normal processes of the active service.
This case would establish a precedent along such lines.
I believe it to be fraught with danger in many ways, and
I, therefore, recommend that the proceedings be disapproved.
On December 30, 1931, President Hoover disapproved the entire
proceedings, including the sentence. Since then, the Army has never
(or hardly ever) " attempted to court-martial a retired officer or
96 It is possible that the letter was the work of General Douglas MacArthur, then
Chief of Staff. The language, if not the policy, is certainly in his style.
97 Here, of course, the Secretary overstated his case, for there was nothing to
prevent the local authorities from prosecuting Major Kearney, had they so desired.
See note 86 supra.
98 Colonel Wiener mentions a subsequent court-martial and dismissal of a retired
Army officer for passing worthless checks. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of
Military Personnel 788. The Colonel's memory is capacious and precise, but I have
been unable to locate any further information on this case, the sentence in which may
have been disapproved by higher authority.
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enlisted man, and neither has the Air Force. Nothing in the intervening third of a century of hot and cold war has caused the Army
to change its mind. Its views are still the same, as demonstrated by
the following extract from the Report, approved by the Secretary, of
its Ad Hoc Committee To Study the Uniform Code of Military
Justice:
The armed forces have court-martial jurisdiction over
retired members of a regular component who are entitled to
draw pay .

.

.

. Retired persons rarely have been tried by

court-martial. However, as a result of their being subject to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Army is often
asked to handle complaints, sometimes frivolous, that retired
personnel are believed to have committed violations of the
Code. The former attitude that members drew retired pay
to keep themselves ready to return to active duty has been replaced by the concept that retired pay is a vested right accruing from honorable service for a prescribed time. Thus one
of the main rationalizations for continuation of court-martial
jurisdiction largely has evaporated.
Retired members of the armed forces are merged with
the general civilian population of the United States. They
should be subject to the same laws as their neighbors with the
same obligations and the same freedom of action. Courtsmartial jurisdiction imposes an obligation to abide by a
different set of laws.
Good order and discipline in the armed forces are not
benefited by continuing jurisdiction over retired members
unless they are on active duty. .

.

.

The Committee con-

siders jurisdiction over retired members unnecessary and
recommends amendment to Article 2, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, to eliminate that jurisdiction. 9
But there is no evidence that the Army's views are shared by the
Department of Defense, which has yet to sponsor the proposed amendment. The Navy's ideas, indeed, are plainly opposed, for at least
twice in recent years it has court-martialed retired officers.
In its legal essentials the first of these cases, that of Admiral
Hooper, 10 0 does not differ greatly from Major Kearney's. The
Admiral, who had retired in 1948 after an honorable and even distinguished career in the Regular Navy, resided in California, where
he engaged in various acts of sodomy, some of them with enlisted
members of the Marine Corps and Navy, in violation of both Sections
99 CO
rMITTEE
ON THE UNIFORM CODE or Mimrr~aY JUSTICE, GOOD ORR AND
DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY, REPORT TO HONORABLE WILBER M. BRUCKER, SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY 175 (1960).

1O0 United

States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958).
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286 and 288a of the California Penal Code and Article 125 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. California seems to have overlooked the Admiral's misconduct. Not so the Navy; indeed it was
the Navy, by methods which, though they may not have violated the
fourth amendment, added very little to the dignity of the service,
On April 15, 1957, he
which uncovered the evidence against him.'
was charged with violations of articles 125 (sodomy), 133 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 134 (conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces) of the Uniform Code. On
May 6 and 7 he was tried by general court-martial, convicted, and
sentenced to be dismissed from the service and to total forfeiture of
pay. The Navy's Board of Review affirmed, making short work of
the accused's contention that he could not constitutionally be tried
unless recalled to active duty,' 2 which could not have been done without his consent. 0 3
At this point, and before the Court of Military Appeals had
acted, 0 4 Admiral Hooper attempted a flanking maneuver, petitioning
a federal district court for injunctive relief and for the convening
of a three-judge court to pass on the constitutionality of article
2(4)."
That court denied relief, on the ground, inter alia, that
the petitioner had not exhausted his military appellate remedies.' 0 6
But the court's conclusions of law included a flat statement that
article 2(4) "appears to be constitutional without doubt, to the extent
that no substantial issue of its unconstitutionality is sufficiently presented as to require the convening" of a three-judge court.' 7 The
court of appeals, though it remarked that "very interesting questions
lurk here," concluded that "the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies . . .
101 No less than four agents of the Office of Naval Intelligence, two of them
commissioned officers, established a stakeout on the roof of a neighboring house,
whence they could observe, with the aid of binoculars, the goings on in the Admiral's
bedroom.
102WC NCM 57-00988 (unpublished), Sept. 10, 1957. The Board, referring to
the "time-honored jurisdiction of courts-martial to try retired regular personnel,"
ruled that Hooper's case was one arising in the naval forces within the meaning of
that clause of the fifth amendment and that he was "still an officer of the Navy." It
held further that his pay was in the nature of salary, rather than a pension for past
services of which he could not constitutionally be deprived.
103 "In time of war or national emergency declared by the President, the Secretary of the Navy may order any retired officer of the Regular Navy or the Regular
Marine Corps to active duty at sea or on shore. At any other time the Secretary may
order such a retired officer to active duty at sea or on shore only with his consent."
10 U.S.C. § 6481 (1958).
104 Since the accused had flag rank, review by that court was mandatory under
article 67(b) (1) of the Code.
I0M The Admiral had not been arrested or confined; hence the writ of habeas
corpus was not available.
10 6Hooper v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437, 441-42 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
107 Id.at 442.
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is implicit in the trial court's judgment" and that on this ground alone
0
the dismissal should be affirmed.

8

Meanwhile the Court of Military Appeals had held unanimously
that the exercise of jurisdiction under article 2(4) did not necessitate
the retired officer's recall to active duty, and that article 2(4), as so
construed, could constitutionally be applied to Hooper. As a matter
of commonsense statutory construction, the first proposition is pretty
clearly correct. As the court pointed out, article 2(1) subjects to the
Code an officer called to duty in the armed forces: "Itnecessarily
follows from this that if Article 2(4) requires the individual be recalled as a condition precedent to its effectiveness, its provisions are
entirely unnecessary and could never be operative." 109 The second
part of the holding is bottomed on a determination that a retired
regular is a part of the land or naval forces:
Officers on the retired list are not mere pensioners in any
sense of the word. They form a vital segment of our national
defense for their experience and mature judgment are relied
upon heavily in times of emergency. The salaries they receive are not solely recompense for past services, but a means
devised by Congress to assure their availability and preparedness in future contingencies. This preparedness depends as much upon their continued responsiveness to discipline as upon their continued state of physical health.
Certainly, one who is authorized to wear the uniform of his
country, to use the title of his grade, who is looked upon as
a model of the military way of life, and who receives a salary
to assure his availability, is a part of the land or naval
forces. 10
This part of the holding raises harder questions, which will
presently be considered. Finally, the Court of Military Appeals held
that all of the articles under which the accused was charged could be
violated by one not on active duty."' On January 7, 1961, President
Eisenhower, cleaning up the papers on his desk, approved the sentence
and ordered it executed. Admiral Hooper's military remedies were
108 274 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1959); cf. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
See note 116 infra.
109 United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 641, 26 C.M.R. 417, 421 (1958).
'I' Id. at 645, 26 C.M.R. at 425.
Ill Ibid. The court reversed and returned the record for reference to a new
reviewing authority on the ground, conceded by the Government, that the post-trial
review by the convening authority's staff legal officer was defective in a number of
respects, none of them relevant to the jurisdictional question. A fresh review again
upheld the conviction, and this time a majority of the Court of Military Appeals
held the review adequate. United States v. Hooper, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 128, 28 C.M.LR.
352 (1960). The second opinion contains no further discussion of the jurisdictional

question.
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then clearly exhausted. In May, 1961, he sued for his pay in the
Court of Claims, presumably on the ground that the court-martial
could not constitutionally try him, and that its sentence was therefore
a nullity. There has as yet been no decision in the case." 2
The problems of Lieutenant Commander Chambers, the object
of the Navy's second experiment with article 2(4), differed considerably in detail, if not in essence. He, too, had been placed on
the retired list; he, too, was charged with acts of sodomy with enlisted
men, in violation of articles 125 and 133, although 134 was omitted,
probably as redundant. Unlike Admiral Hooper, he was charged with
having committed the alleged acts while he was still on active duty,
but this distinction seems of doubtful significance. Since these acts
were, of course, violations of the laws of the states in which they
were committed, and triable in their courts, article 3 (a) could by its
own terms have no application, even assuming it to be constitutional
as to a serviceman whose active duty status is merely changed to
retirement, as distinct from one who is wholly discharged like Toth."1
Since Chambers was not arrested or charged until after he had been
relieved from active duty, he could not be tried under the rule, apparently still solidly in force, that once court-martial jurisdiction attaches
it endures long enough to complete the proceeding, including appellate
review, despite the termination of the accused's enlistment or other
period of subjection to military law."' The Navy's assertion of juris112 There may be some question as to whether the Court of Claims (which does
not have habeas corpus jurisdiction) has jurisdiction over a collateral attack on the
sentence of a court-martial, in the light of article 76 of the Uniform Code, which
purports to make court-martial sentences "binding upon all departments, courts,
agencies, and officers of the United States." Cf. Begalke v. United States, 286 F.2d
606, 607-08 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 865 (1960). The Supreme Court in
Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1950), refused to construe that provision as
a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, but it might be regarded as validly precluding other, less basic forms of collateral attack. See Bishop, Civilian Judges
and Military .Justice,61 CoLum. L. REv. 40, 49, 61 (1961).
113 In any case, article 3(a) presupposes that the accused's status of subjection
to the Code has been terminated after the offense. If article 2(4) is constitutional,
the retired officer's amenability to the Code continues without interruption; even if
it is not constitutional, it might still be argued that article 3(a) at least is constitutional as to one who has not wholly severed his connection with the military.
The Court of Military Appeals and at least one district court have held that
Toth, since it involved a pure civilian who had totally severed his connection with
the military, does not prevent the application of article 3 (a) to one who is on active
duty at the time he is court-martialed, despite the existence of a civilian gap between
the period of service in which the offense was committed and the period of service in
which the court-martial proceedings were initiated. United States v. Wheeler, 10
U.S.C.M.A. 646, 28 C.M.R. 212 (1959); United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A.
506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957); cf. Wheeler v. Reynolds, 164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla.
1958); United States v. Steidley, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 108, 33 C.M.R. 320 (1963).
14 E.g., Gorko v. Commanding Officer, Second Air Force, 314 F.2d 858 (10th
Cir. 1963); Walker v. Morris, 3 Am. Jurist 281 (Mass. 1830); Barrett v. Hopkins, 7 Fed. 312 (C.C.D. Kans. 1881); United States v. Speller, 8 U.S.C.M.A.
363, 24 C.M.R. 173 (1957) ; United States v. Sippel, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 50, 15 C.M.R. 50
(1954) ; see Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 383 (1902) ; Hironimus v. Durant,
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diction had, therefore, to be based solely on article 2 (4). Chambers,
unlike Hooper, had actually been arrested and confined pending trial;
he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus as well as a writ of prohibition. Both were denied." 5 Although Chambers had not even
waited for the trial, the district court chose not to rest upon the petitioner's failure to exhaust his military remedies." 6 The court, describing the constitutionality of article 2(4) as the only question to be
decided, rested its decision of constitutionality on somewhat peculiar
reasoning. After concluding that "a retired officer entitled to receive
pay is not so divorced from the military as to be considered a mere
civilian," and is thus to be distinguished from Mr. Toth, Mrs. Covert,
et al., and arguing that because they may be recalled to service, the
Navy has a legitimate interest in policing its retired officers, the
court said:
Where a retired officer has manifested his unfitness for
a return to full time military service, and has failed to
maintain proper qualifications in conformity with military
ethics and standards, it is not unreasonable to assume that
the Navy may choose to terminate his status. Undoubtedly,
such may be done by Presidential Order. Allen v. United
States, 1950, 91 F. Supp. 933, 117 Ct. Cl. 385.
168 F.2d 288, 293 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 818 (1948). The older courts,
never having heard of United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles and being much influenced
by the consideration that horrendous military offenses, committed by heroes about to
leave the service, could be punished by no one if not by a court-martial, would have
apparently reached the same conclusion even if the accused had been discharged
before charges were preferred. The Massachusetts court in Walker relied heavily
(as did the Government and Justice Reed in Toth) on the case of Lord George
Sackville. Lord George had been depriyed by the King of his command and commission, immediately after the battle of Minden, for disobeying the orders of his
superior officer. After his dismissal which, nautatis inutandis, presumably made him
as full-fledged a civilian as Toth, he demanded a court-martial. The Crown, apparently sharing so early as 1760 the doubts of Justice Black et al., referred the jurisdictional question to "the twelve judges" (from the courts of Kings Bench, Common
Pleas, and Exchequer), who unanimously replied that they saw "no ground to doubt
of the legality of the jurisdiction of a Court-Martial in those circumstances." 2 Eden's
Ch. Rep. 371, 28 Eng. Rep. 940 (1760), quoted in United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 29, n.11 (1955) (dissenting opinion) ; Brief for the Respondent,
id., p. 25, n.10; TYTLER, MiLITARY LAw 113-14 (2d ed. 1808). The court in Walker's
case attached no significance to the fact that Lord George had sought the trial, "for
if the court-martial had no jurisdiction, it is very clear that the consent of the accused
could not confer it." 3 Am. Jurist at 287.
115 Chambers v. Russell, 192 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
116 Itis not entirely clear whether such exhaustion is a condition precedent to
relief when a petitioner in confinement attacks the court-martial's jurisdiction over his
person. In 1951 an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed a decision that a soldier
who had been convicted by a court-martial, and who had excellent grounds for disputing the court's jurisdiction, could not resort to habeas corpus until the mills of the
military review procedure had completed their slow grinding. United States ex rel.
Giese v. Chamberlin, 184 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 845
(1951). But cf. In re Yokoyama, 170 F. Supp. 467 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (district court,
without mentioning the Giese case, permitted a civilian employee to attack collaterally
the constitutionality of article 2(11) without exhausting his military remedies);
Martin v. Young, 134 F. Supp. 204, 209 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
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Administrative action is, therefore, both available and
proper. In accordance with notions of fairness, Congress
has provided for a hearing upon dismissal to facilitate inquiry
into the validity of the dismissal. 10 U.S.C. § 804.
We believe that court martial hearing for the purpose of
discharging a retired member is also reasonably related to
the Navy's legitimate interest, based upon its concern for
discipline, in the fitness and qualifications of its retired officers. Therefore, we conclude that the Navy may proceed
with the court martial herein for the purpose of imposing
proper and necessary discipline. Whether or not the result
of the court martial hearing will go beyond the imposition
of reasonable military sanctions must remain to be seen." 7
The opinion ignores the basic distinction between a court-martial,
whose purpose is punishment, and an administrative separation which,
in theory, is not punitive. It evidences an equal disregard or ignorance of the statutory and regulatory intricacies (some of which postdate Allen, which is cited by the court) which make nearly impossible
the administrative separation of retired officers. But it does contain
the germ of an interesting idea, that a court-martial may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over such an officer for certain limited purposes, and it does serve to focus attention on the fundamental problem
of why the Navy thought it necessary to resort to so drastic a measure.
At any rate, however unsatisfactory, it seems to have been the last
judicial consideration of the problem, for I can find no report of
further proceedings before either a board of review, the Court of
Military Appeals, or the civilian courts. Had Chambers been convicted
and sentenced to dismissal, article 66(b) would have required reference to a board of review, and it is unlikely that the Court of Military
Appeals would have denied review. Not all opinions of boards of
review are reported; the reports of the opinions of the Court of Military
Appeals are, however, reasonably complete. The Navy may have
decided to drop the case, or it is conceivable, though perhaps unlikely,
that the court-martial acquitted him, or sentenced him to some lesser
punishment than dismissal or confinement.
Before considering the constitutional question and the validity of
the holdings in the Hooper and Chambers cases, it may be interesting
to speculate on the practical reasons for the Navy's policy. In favor
of that policy there are some obvious considerations. The conduct of
each retired officer directly affected enlisted men on active duty, and
the civilian authorities seem to have taken no measures to repress that
117

192 F. Supp. at 428.

346

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.112:317

conduct. There is no doubt that, to the extent that it was known that
persons having naval rank and entitled to wear the uniform were
engaged in such delinquencies, the naval service would be brought into
disrepute. Neither Hooper nor Chambers was of advanced age; in
their cases there really was as much force as there ever is in the
argument that they were paid and retained on the rolls in part at
least to keep them available for recall to active duty. Finally, if it be
assumed that their elimination was desirable, there was practically no
other way to accomplish it.
Until shortly after the Civil War, the President could remove
any officer summarily, without cause. But one of the by-products
of Congress' vendetta against Andrew Johnson was the so-called
Tenure of Office Act of 1866, which inter alia purports to prohibit
the peacetime dismissal of an officer of the armed forces by presidential
action, except pursuant to sentence of a general court-martial.1 8 Although the constitutionality of such a congressional limitation on the
power of the Commander in Chief has never been directly adjudicated
by the Supreme Court, it may well be doubted."' There are, of
course, elaborate statutory and administrative provisions for the
Deliberately
elimination of unfit military personnel on active duty.'
or not, nothing comparable exists in the case of those who are retired.
Article 4 of the Uniform Code, cited by the court in Chambers to
support the proposition that the petitioner could be removed by
executive action, is not at all in point. It provides in essence that a
commissioned officer, "dismissed by order of the President," may
demand that the President convene a court-martial to try him on the
charges on which he was dismissed.' 2' But the current version of the
1S Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 176, § 5, 14 Stat. 92; see Wallace v. United States,
257 U.S. 541, 545 (1922); Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227, 234-35 (1881);
Allen v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 933, 935 (Ct. Cl. 1950); BURNs, THE DEADLOCK
OF DEMOcRAcY 74 (1963); Colby, The Power of the President To Remove Officers
of the Army, 15 GEo. L.J. 168 (1927).
119 Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding unconstitutional a
statute providing that postmasters could be removed only with the advice and consent
of the Senate). Even Justice Brandeis, who dissented in Myers, recognized that
there might be a stronger case for the President's power to dismiss Army and Navy
officers: "We need not consider what power the President, being Commander in Chief,
has over officers in the Army and the Navy." Id. at 241.
The
120 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 3781-86, 3791-96, 6384, 8781-86, 8791-96 (1958).
history of these statutes and regulations, and the administrative practice under them,
were exhaustively described by the indefatigable Colonel Wiener in the course of the
Senate hearings. See Hearingson ConstitutionalRights of Military Personnel 736-73,
800-02. 10 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (1958).
121 The article seems to raise a problem similar to that of Lord Sackville's case:
if the officer is validly dismissed, and therefore a civilian, how can his consent give
the court-martial jurisdiction denied it by the Constitution? A possible solution is
that the dismissal is conditional and ineffective until the court has reached a verdict;
if no court is convened the dismissal is to be superseded by "a form of discharge
authorized for administrative issue." The problem, though intriguing, seems largely
academic, for there is only one modern instance of an officer's being dismissed by
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pertinent part of the Tenure of Office Act,'2 provides in substance that
a commissioned officer cannot in peacetime be dismissed by order of
the President. Unless the President had chosen to challenge the
constitutionality of section 1161(a), H-ooper and Chambers could not
have been dismissed by executive action, and article 4 has nothing to
do with their cases. Subsection (b) of the statute empowers the
President at any time to "drop from the rolls" (including, of course,
the payroll) of any of the armed forces an officer, active or retired,
who is finally convicted of an offense by a civilian court and sentenced
This was in fact the provision involved in the
to confinement.'3
Allen case which the district court cited in the quoted extract from
Chambers. The distinction between "dismissal" and "dropping from
the rolls" is emphasized by the fact that officers in the latter category
are not entitled to demand a court-martial, as the Allen case itself
held, and as is now made explicit by subsection (d) of article 4 of the
Code. Indeed, an officer who is dropped from the rolls thereby becomes a civilian who cannot be court-martialed without his consent
and probably not even with it.1"'
Not even this very limited exception to the general congressional
failure to provide an administrative method of separating officers on
the retired list was available to the Navy in Hooper and Chambers.
Neither one had been convicted or sentenced to confinement by a
civilian court. Both Congress and the Secretary of Defense appear
to view with disfavor the dropping from the rolls of a retired officer,
even if he has been so convicted and sentenced-precisely because it
entails the forfeiture of pay which has been earned by prior honest
and faithful service. Again, only the Navy had ever taken advantage
of the provision; the Army and the Air Force, and even the Marines
(although a part of the Navy), seem to have had no more interest in
dropping from the rolls their retired officers, however sinful, than
they had in court-martialing them. This inequality of treatment having
come to the attention of Congress in 1958, that body took action
whose net effect was to restore to the pay- and other rolls retired
the President and demanding a court-martial. President Wilson, in time of war,
dismissed one Colonel Wallace, who thereupon asserted his right to court-martial
under the predecessor of article 4, Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 12, 13 Stat. 489.
The Supreme Court avoided the problem (which, since Toth, Covert, et al. were
still far in the future, it might not have seen in any case) by holding that § 12 applied
only to dismissals by the President alone, and that, since Colonel Wallace's successor
in the complement of Quartermaster Colonels allowed by law had already been appointed and approved by the Senate, that action amounted to senatorial advice and
consent. Wallace v. United States, 257 U.S. 541 (1922).

= 10 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (1958).

Since subsection (a) of the statute places no restriction on their separation, the President's
to discharge a retired enlisted man is presumably intact.
authority
=4 Ex parte Wilson, 33 F.2d 214 (E.D. Va. 1929).
1 3 There appears to be no corresponding provision for enlisted men.
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naval officers who had been dropped therefrom, pending the carrying
out of the recommendation of the House and Senate committees that
the Department of Defense prescribe a uniform policy for all three
services. 2 5 That uniform policy'126 now proscribes the dropping from
the rolls of retired officers, save only when deprivation of their pay is
required by the Hiss Act."2 7 The Hiss Act denies, inter alia, retired
pay to former members of the armed forces convicted of sundry varieties of corruption, espionage, subversion, and related offenses, including refusal to testify about alleged Communist connections, and
provides that those who are thus deprived of retired pay may be
dropped from the rolls. But even that statute, though passed at a time
when Congress was far from finicky about the rights of individuals
guilty of such offenses, did not cut off retired pay, the right to which
had accrued prior to its enactment, because of convictions prior to that
date-apparently because Congress had doubts as to the constitutionality of cutting off such a "vested" right. 2 ' The Defense Department's new directive described itself as "in furtherance of the Department of Defense view that retired pay is earned and should be withheld only under extremely limited circumstances."
The upshot is that the Navy, or the Army, or the Air Force, if it
wishes to strip a retired officer of a rank and uniform on which he is
reflecting no credit, in itself a reasonable enough objective, can do
so only by bringing into action a jurisdictional weapon of far greater
power than is necessary to the achievement of the limited objective.
The general court-martial could inflict imprisonment; and it must, if it
is to dismiss the officer, at the same time deprive him of his pension 2 '
-in effect, assuming him to have a substantial life expectancy, a
money penalty of monstrous proportions, having no rational relation
to the gravity of the offense. The reasoning of the district court in
the Chambers case, particularly the quaint notion that the "courtmartial hearing" was really only a sort of administrative process for
the implementation of the presidential power (which Congress has
purported to abolish in peacetime) to separate a delinquent retired
officer by executive action, may have been faulty. There is, however,
125 10 U.S.C. § 1161 (1958) ; see S. REP. No. 2312, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958);
H.R. REP. No. 2156, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
12632 C.F.R. §§ 70.801-03 (1960).
12768 Stat. 1142 (1954), 5 U.S.C. §§2281-88 (1958).
128 See Hearings on Denying Civil Service and Other Federal Benefits to Certain
Persons Before the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-10 (1954) ; McHughes, The Hiss Act and Its Application to the Military,
Military L. Rev., Oct. 1961, pp. 67, 69-70.
129 "Upon ceasing to hold the office, the right to pay, being an emolument thereof
and dependent thereon, likewise ceases." Hooper v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437, 441
(S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 274 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1959).
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undoubtedly a core of common sense in the somewhat elliptical suggestion, contained in the last quoted paragraph of the opinion, that
while a court-martial might constitutionally have jurisdiction to impose
a "reasonable" punishment, such as dismissal, a different question
might be presented if it went further, as by sentencing the accused to
confinement.
Whether Chambers' case will present that different question is
unknown; Hooper's does not, unless it could be argued that forfeiture
of retired pay (which, under the present law, is an inevitable corollary
of dismissal) is a punishment which cannot constitutionally be inflicted. The validity of that argument is, however, very doubtful. In
dictum some thirty years ago, the Supreme Court said that "pensions
. . . and other privileges accorded to former members of the army
and navy . . . are gratuities. They involve no agreement of parties;

and the grant of them creates no vested right. The benefits conferred
by gratuities may be redistributed or withdrawn at any time in the
discretion of Congress." '0 That view of a pension, or at least of
one paid pursuant to a provision in force during the recipient's employment and which is morally, if not technically, a part of his contract of employment, was somewhat old-fashioned even when it was
written. 13 1 The Department of Defense policy, mentioned above, that
130 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1934). The Court cited United
States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64 (1882), Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895),
and United States v. Cook, 257 U.S. 523 (1922). Only Teller is in point on its facts;
the other two are at best dicta. Teller held only that a wounded veteran of the
Mexican War, who had been in receipt of a pension under a special act of Congress,
could not, when that pension was superseded by a larger one under a general pension
act which cut off all lesser pensions under previous special laws, claim a constitutional
right to receive both pensions. Though the Court did state that "no pensioner has a
vested legal right to his pension" and that "pensions are the bounties of the Government, which Congress has the right to give, withhold, distribute, or recall, at its
discretion," 107 U.S. at 68, the pension involved was in fact in the nature of a gratuity,
in the sense that Congress had not provided for it until after the pensioner had received
his wounds; it could hardly have been regarded as one of the terms of his employment
Lynch itself held that benefits under War Risk Insurance, being bottomed on contract,
could not constitutionally be reduced by Congress.
131 Cf., e.g., Roddy v. Valentine, 268 N.Y. 228, 197 N.E. 260 (1935) (holding
that a policeman, having satisfied the statutory conditions, acquired an irrevocable
right to a public pension) ; see Note, 70 {A.Rv. L. Rmv. 490 (1957) ; Note, 53 HARv.
L. REv. 1375 (1940). The Court of Claims had held in 1893 that a retired naval
officer was a "salaried officer of the United States" rather than a mere pensioner:
"We cannot agree, that, because of his retirement . . . his 'pay' simply becomes a
bounty in the nature of a pension. That 'pay,' in our opinion, is given partly for
past service, partly for present liability to military discipline and possibility of detail to
active and dangerous employment in case of emergency . . . ." Franldin v. United
States, 29 Ct Cl. 6, 11 (1893). A few years later the same court said that retired
pay was "but an honorary form of pension . . . . [T]he pay of a retired officer is not
compensation .. . ." Geddes v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 428, 445 (1903). More
recently, the Court of Claims has held that, for purposes of the Federal Employees
Compensation Act, 39 Stat 743 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 757 (1958), retired
pay is neither "salary, pay or remuneration . . . in return for services actually performed" nor a "pension." Steelman v. United States, 318 F.2d 733, 734 (Ct Cl.
1963) ; cf. Lemly v. United States, -75 F. Supp. 248 (Ct. Cl. 1948). The court did
not explain what retired pay could be if it was neither of these things.
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retired pay is "earned," corresponds much more closely to present day
concepts. Nevertheless, it could not be safely predicted that the
Supreme Court would today hold that retired pay is a vested right of
which the pensioner cannot constitutionally be deprived, particularly
if the deprivation is pursuant to the sentence of a court, military or
otherwise.'
The Court of Claims has held that a retired civil servant
could not constitutionally, under the Hiss Act, be deprived of his
annuity for having refused, on grounds of self-incrimination, to testify
before a grand jury. 8 3 But the four judges who constituted the
majority emphasized that the plaintiff's pension had been suspended
without any sort of trial; two of them regarded the act, as applied, as
a bill of attainder, and the other two thought it objectionable as a
divestment, without due process, of a vested right. One who is deprived of retired pay pursuant to the sentence of a court-martial has
certainly received a hearing, and probably due process as well.
Assuming that the President, certainly with and possibly without
congressional sanction, may dismiss any officer, and assuming further
that Congress can constitutionally provide for the termination of a
retired officer's pension pursuant to some sort of adequate administrative or judicial process, the question is whether that process may
take the form of a court-martial. Although strong views to the contrary have been expressed,"3 I incline to the view that it can.
For what it is worth, there is a good deal of precedent for such
a view, though most of it is somewhat antique, and there is no such
thing as a square holding by a federal appellate court. Colonel
Winthrop, whose opinion that civilians could not constitutionally be
court-martialed 135 was much relied upon by the Supreme Court, had
not the smallest doubt about the retired list; he thought it "a fact . . .
never admitting of question" that "retired officers are a part of the
Army and so triable by court-martial .

.

.

."

'

The Colonel relied

2

18 The Court recently held that Congress could constitutionally cut off the
Social Security benefits of aliens deported for having been Communists, since the
right to such benefits was not an "accrued property right." Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603 (1960). The dissenters argued that the termination amounted to punishment without judicial trial. Id. at pp. 622, 640.
133 Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
134 See Blair, Court-MartialJurisdictionOver Retired Regulars: An Unwarranted
Extension of Military Power, 50 GEo. L.J. 79 (1961). The title of the article sufficiently summarizes its conclusions. Actually, most of the author's arguments seem
to be addressed to the unwisdom of the jurisdiction rather than to its constitutionality.
135 WINTHROP

36

105.

Id. at 87, n.27. The Blackstone of Military Law, as Mr. Justice Black likes
to call him, had some reason to believe that a retired officer is still a part of the armed
forces. When he himself attempted after his retirement to represent a claimant
against the Government, the Court of Claims held that, since he was on the retired
list, he was an "officer of the United States" within the meaning of one of the
conflicts of interest statutes and thus barred from acting as an attorney in the case.
In re Winthrop, 31 Ct. Cl. 35 (1895). The court had the courtesy not to cite
Winthrop.
'
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principally upon United States v. Tyler.8 7 Although that case held
only that an officer on the retired list, receiving pay, was within the
scope of a statute raising the pay of "commissioned officers," the Court
clearly took it as an uncontroverted fact that retired officers were
subject to the Articles of War, and indeed used that premise to buttress
its holding; a man could hardly be court-martialed and dismissed from
a service he was not in. The Court's reasoning is an interesting contrast to that which it employed eighty years later: in effect, the Court
said in 1881 that the fact that Congress has subjected a man to military
trial without a jury demonstrates in itself that he is a part of the land
and naval forces. 188 Runkle v. United States,89 which appears to be
the only decision of the Supreme Court actually involving the courtmartial of a retired officer, furnishes no more solid authority on the
constitutional question. In fact, the opinion does not even contain
apposite dicta, for no one concerned, including the accused, seems to
have questioned the court-martial's jurisdiction, and the Court held
Major Runkle's dismissal invalid solely on the ground that it had not
been duly approved by President Grant, who had improperly delegated
his discretion to the Secretary of War. Since Grant had previously
remitted all of the sentence except the cashiering, and President Hayes
had issued an order revoking that too, the only issue was whether
Runkle was entitled to his retired pay for the period between his
allegedly invalid cashiering and its revocation. President Grant's
administrative deficiencies and his clemency are regrettable, for the
case seems to be the only one in which a court-martial did more than
sentence a retired officer to dismissal, and so could have posed the
constitutional issue beautifully. 140 A guess may be hazarded that the
U.S. 244 (1881).
1 "It is impossible to hold that men who are by statute declared to be a part
3.37105
38

of the Army, who may wear its uniform, whose names shall be borne upon its register,

who may be assigned by their superior officers to specified duties by detail as other
officers are, who are subject to the rules and articles of war, and may be tried, not
by a jury, as other citizens are, but by a military court-martial, for any breach of
those rules, and who may finally be dismissed on such trial from the service in disgrace,
are still noot in the military service." Id. at 246. The reference to assignment to
"specified duties" is probably an allusion to the former practice of detailing retired
officers as members of courts-martial. In Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1921),
the Court answered an argument that retired officers, not being officers "in the military
service of the United States" as required by the Articles of War, were incompetent
to sit as members of a court-martial, by saying that "as to the retired officers . . .
it is not open to question in view of the ruling in United States v. Tyler . . . that

such officers are officers in the military service of the United States." Article 25 of
the Uniform Code now requires that members of a court-martial be on active duty.
139 122 U.S. 543 (1887).
140 Runkle, who had been placed on the retired list in 1870, served as a disbursing agent of the Freedmen's Bureau both before and after his retirement. He
was court-martialled in 1872, charged with offenses committed both before and after
retirement. Since the alleged transgressions amounted to embezzlement of government moneys, those committed during his active service came under the Act of

March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 2, 12 Stat. 696, which provided that court-martial jurisdiction
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Court of those days, having held that Captain Tyler was an officer
of the United States because he was subject to court-martial, would
have been quite as ready to hold that Major Runkle was subject to
court-martial because he was an officer of the United States.
Closest to a decision on point, prior to the modem cases, seems to
be Closson v. Armes.'4 1 Captain George A. Armes, retired, wrote to
Lieutenant General John M. Schofield, an elderly and apparently somewhat irascible Civil War hero who was then commanding the Army
of the United States, a "letter of an offensive character." At least
General Schofield found it offensive; deeming that "a grave act of
military insubordination and violation of military discipline had been
committed," he ordered Armes to be arrested and confined pending
court-martial on charges of conduct to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline and conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
Armes immediately sought habeas corpus. The court, deciding the
only issue before it, held the arrest and confinement proper. Such a
holding necessarily seems to import that the court-martial for which
Armes was being held would have jurisdiction over him-but Armes'
counsel had conceded that point. The case is simply another illustration of the fact that until comparatively recent times most courts and
lawyers, military and civilian, though sometimes hostile to the exercise
of military jurisdiction over persons who were obviously pure
civilians," were not ready to question military jurisdiction over those
who had some connection with the military. The evolution of constitutional law had simply not reached the point at which such an
issue could be seriously raised. Whether it has yet reached that point
remains to be seen. At any rate, there is no case prior to Hooper
which squarely decides or considers the constitutionality of subjecting
a retired officer to military jurisdiction.14
to try such offenses should survive separation from the service. He would thus have
been amenable to the military court's jurisdiction on these charges even if he had
been a pure civilian. See text accompanying note 32 stepra. He was convicted of violation of the 1863 statute and of conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman and
sentenced to dismissal, a substantial fine, and four to eight years confinement. In
order to invalidate the conviction and sentence, the Court would have had to hold
unconstitutional both the 1863 statute and the provision subjecting retired officers to

military jurisdiction.
1417 App. D.C. 460 (1896).
142 Cf., e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) ; Ex parte Henderson,
11 Fed. Cas. 1067 (No. 6349) (C.C.D. Ky. 1878).
143 Mention should also be made of Taussig v. McNamara, 219 F. Supp. 757
(D.D.C. 1963), in which a retired regular naval officer sought, inter alia, a declaratory
judgment that article 2(4) was unconstitutional-apparently as part of a general,
unsuccessful effort to remove statutory obstacles to representing would-be government contractors in their relations with the Navy. The court found no substantial
constitutional issue, citing among others the Armes, Hooper, and Chambers cases.
Id. at 759 n.3.
A question frequently posed was the status of a retired officer under various
statutes dealing with conflict of interest, eligibility for civil office, and the like. E.g.,
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The court in the Armes case did, however, stress one sound and
significant point-Captain Armes' offense was certainly military.
Indeed, if it was not a military crime, it was not a crime at all, and if
it required punishment, only a court-martial could punish it. As the
court said:
If there were occasion to conjecture what the purpose
of Congress was in holding retired officers of the army to
trial by court-martial for infractions of military law, and
what the offences were which it was contemplated they might
commit, no better illustration could be afforded of the subject
than the offences here charged against the appellee. It would
be difficult to conceive a case to which the statute would be
more appropriate. 4 4
In 1896 courts-martial had no peacetime jurisdiction over civilian
offenses as such. 45 If Captain Armes had beaten his wife or stolen
General Schofield's watch, he could have been court-martialed only
for the military aspects of those offenses; i.e., to the extent that wifebeating or watch-stealing is conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, or, after 1912, conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces. For a distinctively military offense, or the distinctively military aspect of an ordinary offense, the appropriate
punishment should likewise be distinctively military. Practically
speaking, in the case of retired personnel, this means dismissal for an
officer or dishonorable discharge for an enlisted man, which (former
Franklin v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 6 (1893) (holding that a retired naval officer
was a "salaried officer of the United States" for the purpose of a statute which provided that delegates to an international conference should be paid unless they fell in
that category) ; Geddes v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 428 (1903) (holding that a retired
officer was not an "officer or employee of the Government" within the intent of a
statute forbidding double compensation) ; 29 Ops. ATT'Y GENI.397 (1912) (opinion
that a retired officer was an "officer of the Government" for the purpose of a conflict
of interest statute) ; 36 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 388 (1930) (opining that a retired officer,
being a "mere pensioner" who did not "practically belong to the Army," was "from
civil life" within the meaning of a statutory requirement that two Commissioners
of the District of Columbia meet that test) ; Reed v. Schon, 2 Cal. App. 55, 83 Pac.
77 (Dist. Ct App. 1905) (holding that a retired officer was not a "person holding
• . . lucrative office under the United States" within the meaning of a state constitutional provision barring such persons from state office); People v. Duane, 121
N.Y. 367, 24 N.E. 845 (1890) (holding that a retired officer did not hold "federal
office" within the meaning of a state statute defining the qualifications of certain
civil officers of the state) ; State v. De Gress, 53 Tex. 387 (1880) (holding that a
retired officer held "lucrative office under authority of the United States" within the
meaning of a city charter prohibiting such persons from being mayor). See also
note 131, supra. Some of these opinions, like that of the Supreme Court in Tyler,
take it for granted that retired officers are subject to military jurisdiction, but aside
from the fact that they are impossible to reconcile with one another, their precedent
value is nil, because all were concerned with the legislative intent behind various
statutory phrases, and none dealt with the constitutional issue with which this Article
is concerned.
144 7 App. D.C. 460, 471 (1896).
145 See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
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Secretary of Defense Wilson to the contrary) is a punishment that
only a court-martial can lawfully inflict. 4 ' Such a punishment is, of
course, beyond the power of a civilian court. It is also, in any case
which is likely to arise, the only punishment which would seem to be
required by the legitimate needs of the military, and thus sanctioned
by the principle that the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of a courtmartial to the "least possible power adequate to the end proposed." 17
In the usual case, including Hooper and Chambers, that interest appears to be limited to removing the officer from the service by stripping
him of his rank, his right to wear the uniform, and other honorific
incidents of his status as a member of a community which claims to
have higher standards of honor than the general run of the populationand doing so by a form of separation which entails disgrace. It must
be emphasized that dismissal and dishonorable discharge, notwithstanding that the injury which they inflict is largely to the feelings and
reputation of the outcast, and even though they are not now usually
accompanied by drums, sword-breaking, button-snipping, and the rest
of the picturesque classical paraphernalia, are highly punitive measures.
For this very reason they have traditionally been inflicted only by the
judicial process of a court-martial. 4 ' If the offense is so flagitious
as to require more severe punishment, that can be left to the civilian
courts. If it is a violation of state law, as would ordinarily be the
146 Secretary of Defense Wilson, presumably influenced by political rather than
legal reasoning, purported to issue administrative dishonorable discharges to a small
number of American soldiers who, having defected to the Chinese Communists after
capture in the Korean War, could not be brought before a court-martial. The Secretary's action, which was taken over the objections of the Judge Advocate General of
the Army, was clearly illegal, for it had always been ruled that only a court-martial
could inflict such a punitive discharge. See Pasley, Sentence First-Verdict Afterward: Dishonorable Discharge Without Trial by Court-Martial?,41 CoRN. L.Q. 545
(1956). Its legality was never challenged, however, for when the turncoats returned
to the United States, they were not so foolish as to subject themselves to the possibility of court-martial and prison by establishing the nullity of their discharges. Since
Secretary Wilson had not pushed his impersonation of a one-man, ex parte, general
court-martial to the point of sentencing them to retroactive forfeitures, they did sue
for their pay up to the date of discharge. The Court of Claims, firmly ignoring a
statute which entitled the plaintiffs to that pay while they were prisoners of war,
no matter how reprehensible their conduct in that status, held that they had breached
their contract of enlistment and voluntarily abandoned their status as soldiers. Bell
v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 668 (Ct. Cl. 1960). Judge Madden's vigorous and
cogent dissent pointed out that, under article 58 of the Uniform Code, not even a
court-martial could have sentenced them to forfeit accrued pay. These pitiful wretches
thus capped their disservices to the United States by being the occasion of a remarkable body of bad law.
'47 See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1950).
(Emphasis deleted.)
148 See Pasley, supra note 146, at 551-53; United States v. Briscoe, 13 U.S.C.M.A.
510, 33 C.M.R. 42 (1963). The economic disadvantages of a punitive discharge, via
disentitlement to statutory veterans' benefits and the like, are not appreciably greater
than those resulting from an administrative undesirable discharge. See Hearings
on S. 3906 Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29
(1954).

1964]
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149
If the offense
case, no question of former jeopardy is presented.
is federal, there might be more difficult problems, for it is not clear
that the same act could, for example, be tried in a federal court as
a violation of the Mann Act and again before a court-martial as the
military offense of conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman,
50
and/or conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
But the Court of Military Appeals, at least, seems to regard the civilian
and military components of a wrongful act as constituting distinct
offenses, for it has held that a serviceman cannot be convicted under
the general article of an act not specifically denounced elsewhere in the
code, unless the members of the court have been instructed by the
law officer that they must find the accused's conduct was in fact
prejudicial to good order and military discipline or of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces, 51 a finding which would not be very
2
difficult to make in such cases as Hooper and Chambers." Of course,
if the federal court actually convicts the offender and sentences him to
53
It is not easy to
confinement, he can be dropped from the rolls.
conceive of a retired officer's committing a purely military offense, not
covered by any civilian penal provision, which could not be adequately
punished by dismissal. Those who are not on active duty can hardly
commit the usual serious military offenses--desertion, disobedience
of orders, cowardice, and the like. If a retired officer did contrive to
commit a grave military offense-if he were, for example, to conspire
to create a mutiny, and if (which seems unlikely) his actions were not

149 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
150 See Kates, Former Jeopardy-A Comparison of the Military and Cizilian
Right, Military L. Rev., Jan. 1962, pp. 51, 65. Compare Grafton v. United States, 206
U.S. 333 (1907), with In re Stubbs, 133 Fed. 1012 (D. Wash. 1905). The Stubbs
case held that a homicide, charged as "conduct to the prejudice of good order and

military discipline," was a different offense from the same homicide, charged as
murder, of which the soldier had been acquitted in a civilian court. In Grafton the
Supreme Court decided that a soldier who had been acquitted by a court-martial of
a violation of the general article, based on homicide, could not thereafter be tried by
a Philippine civil court (also deriving its authority from the United States) for
"assassination" in violation of the Philippines Penal Code. Grafton, however, seems
to have been charged under the "all crimes not capital" clause of that article rather
than with the specifically military offense of "conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the military service."
151 United States v. Grosso, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 566, 23 C.M.R. 30 (1957) (mailing of
a defamatory letter); United States v. Gittens, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 673, 25 C.M.R. 177
(1958) (assault on military policeman); United States v. Lawrence, 8 U.S.C.M.A.
732, 25 C.M.R. 236 (1958) (assault on civilian policeman). The "crimes and offenses
not capital" denounced in the third clause of the article include only those which are
violations of federal law. See U.S. DEI"T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MIARTIAL
11213c (1951).
152 The Court of Military Appeals recently held, in the case of a dishonorably
discharged prisoner, that one need not be in active military service to engage in
conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. United States v.
Ragan, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 33 C.M.R. 331 (1963).
353 See text accompanying note 123 supra.
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within the ambit of any of the anti-subversion statutes-the military
might have a legitimate need to inflict a greater punishment, and consequently Congress might constitutionally empower them to do so.
In ordinary circumstances, however, it is probable that any such
case which may confront the federal courts will involve no more than
dismissal and its concomitant, forfeiture of pay. The latter, as above
suggested, seems neither just nor necessary to the preservation of discipline in the armed forces. The pay of one on the retired list seems
to be in reality compensation for past services and only to a relatively
minor extent, if at all, a retainer to keep the recipient available for
recall to active duty. Congress and the President can, after all, call
anyone to active service without paying him a fee for standing by.
But in the present state of the law-which is not, of course, immutable-there seems to be no way to dismiss or discharge a retired
serviceman without at the same time cutting off his pension. Such
a deprivation of earned pay, though it may not be unconstitutional, 15
seems an act of meanness above and beyond the call of economy on
the part of a government which habitually thinks in eleven or twelve
figures.
The preparation of form sheets for the Supreme Court and the
accurate prediction of its holdings is a sport requiring a high degree
of both expertise and luck. On balance, I think it more probable than
not that the Court, applying its status tests, would be inclined to find
that retired personnel have a sufficiently military flavor to be regarded
for constitutional purposes as part of the land or naval forces. But
it is possible that the gross and disproportionate hardship of the
collateral economic sanction, though perhaps not in itself directly relevant, might be the factor which would make the case sufficiently hard
to tip the Court, despite its earlier dicta, toward a holding that the
retired serviceman is essentially a civilian who cannot be courtmartialed for any offense or for any purpose. Such a holding might
be averted by legislation-in my opinion, desirable in any case-which
would permit the separation from the military community of retired
servicemen who disgrace that community, without forfeiting the pensions earned by past honorable service. Even if such separation is an
inherent power of the Commander-in-Chief, which Congress can
neither restrict nor confer, legislation would be essential to permit
separation without loss of pension rights, and desirable to avoid the
rekindling of ancient constitutional strife between President and
Congress. In the case of conduct so flagitious as to require the
ignominy of a punitive separation, dismissal or dishonorable discharge
154 See text acompanying note 128 supra.
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should be inflicted only pursuant to the processes of military justiceagain stripping the offender of his military status but leaving him
his pension.
III. COURT-MARTIAL

JURISDICTION OVER ASSORTED RESERVISTS

The commonplace arguments adduced to support court-martial
jurisdiction over retired servicemen, whether veterans of the SpanishAmerican or the Korean War-that they may be recalled to save their
country at any time, like Cincinnatus from the plow, and that the
armed forces therefore have an interest in maintaining discipline and
fitness among these potential reinforcements-seems rather more
plausible when applied to reservists, who are in reality likely to be
called to service in emergencies. But despite its declarations of the
vital role of the reserves in the military establishment,' 55 Congress
evidently did not think that the maintenance of military discipline and
efficiency among reservists (who number several millions of voters and
whose lobbies are vigorous and vociferous) demanded broad courtmartial jurisdiction. The only categories of reservists not actually on
active duty who are covered by article 2 of the Uniform Code are those
who have been ordered to such duty, whether or not they have actually
reported; 156 reservists on inactive duty training 1 under orders,
voluntarily accepted, which specify subjection to the code; retired
members of a reserve component who are receiving hospitalization
from one of the armed forces; and members of the Navy's Fleet and
Marine Corps Reserve. In practice, none of these explicit provisions
has so far posed any serious problem. The provision subjecting
reservists to court-martial jurisdiction from the time of their call to
active duty has statutory ancestry as old as the Constitution and is
plainly constitutional. Similar jurisdiction was upheld long ago in
155E.g., 10 U.S.C. §262 (1958):
The purpose of the reserve components is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or
national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires,
to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during, and after the period
needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve
the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the
regular components.
15
6 In this respect reservists differ significantly from draftees, who are not subject to the Code until they have actually been inducted. See note 91 supra.
157 The phrase refers to the reservist's attendance at periodic "drills," usually
one evening a week or one weekend a month, for which he may or may not be paid,
as distinct from his annual two weeks of active duty for training. During the latter
period he is as subject to court-martial jurisdiction as any other soldier on active
duty, and if he commits a serious offense he can be retained in that status pending

investigation and possible charges.

an instance in which this was done.

See N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1963, p. 33, col. 2, for
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Houston v. Moore, 5 ' and in Martin v. Mott. 59 In the former case,
Justice Story, who dissented from the holding that Houston could be
tried only by a federal court-martial, had grave doubts as to whether
such a court-martial (as distinct from the Pennsylvania court-martial
which had convicted him) could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction
"until the drafted troops are mustered and in the actual pay and
Story's doubts, however, found no echo in
service of the Union." '
the federal courts when the Congress of 1917 provided for the courtmartialing of conscripts who failed to report for induction; the convictions of such draft evaders were upheld whenever challenged.' 6'
The military connection of a reservist seems closer than that of a
contumacious conscript, who has never taken the oath or had anything
at all to do with the armed forces beyond the receipt of an order to
report for induction. But the section, however constitutional, is not
often used. Moreover, the solitary case under the section 162 raised no
issue of constitutionality, for the petitioner's sole contention was that
only subsection (3) of article 2, dealing with inactive duty training,
provided for subjection to the Code of a reservist not on active dutyand then only when he had voluntarily accepted orders so specifying.
The fatal objection to this argument was that article 2(1) put the
petitioner on active duty, and thus subject to the Code, from the
moment he was ordered to report.
The court-martialing under subsection (3) of a reservist on
inactive duty training might present interesting constitutional problems, but no such case has yet arisen. This may at first blush occasion
some surprise, for the statute on its face confers a wide-ranging juris63
diction; if appropriate orders were issued and "voluntarily" accepted,
158 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 20 (1820): "It has already been admitted, that if
Congress had pleased so to declare, a militiaman, called into the service of the United
States, might have been held and considered as being constructively in that service,
though not actually so; and might have been treated in like manner as if he had
appeared at the place of rendezvous."
15925 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
160 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 61.
161 United States ex rel. Bergdoll v. Drum, 107 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 648 (1940) ; United States v. McIntyre, 4 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1925) ;
United States ex rel. Feld v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 704 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S.
760 (1923) ; Franke v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1918) ; see Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1944).
162 Petition of LaPlata, 174 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1959). LaPlata's client,
one Fisher, was a Marine Corps Ready Reservist who failed to comply with his
statutory training obligations. As provided by the statute in such cases, he was
forcibly reminded of that obligation by an order to report for 45 days of "additional
Thereupon he was
active duty for training." 10 U.S.C. §270(a), (b) (1958).
taken into custody by the Marine Corps Police, though it does not appear that any
charges were actually filed against him.
163 The Ready Reservist, at least, may not have much real choice about accepting
them. If the inactive duty training required by the statute is to be performed pursuant
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the citizen soldier snoozing his way through a Thursday evening course
on the Theory and Practice of Quartermaster Stock Inventories or
some such exciting branch of military learning, might, if the statute is
taken at face value, be court-martialed for failing to pay attention.
But, in fact, the services have made no effort to seize this apparent
opportunity to expand their criminal jurisdiction. The reservist during the short period of his inactive duty drill has little opportunity to
commit any serious offense, and still less to commit one which cannot
be adequately dealt with by the civilian police.'64 More, the legislative
history of the subsection plainly shows that Congress intended the jurisdiction to be confined to those reservists whose inactive duty training
involved the use of equipment, such as aircraft, whose misuse might
entail disastrous consequences."6 5 The courts, therefore, notwithstanding the seeming latitude of the language, would probably not permit
the subsection to be used in other circumstances. Finally, since the
period of inactive duty training is usually only two or three hours and
never longer than a weekend, the process of military justice would
have to be initiated very rapidly, for the trainee's subjection to the
For these reasons-plus, perCode ends with the training period.'
haps, doubts about constitutionality-there seems to be no instance of
a court-martial of a reservist under article 2(3). Subdivision (5) of
article 2, covering retired reservists who are receiving hospitalization
from the armed forces, is equally comatose. The retired reservist, in
sharp contrast to the retired regular, is thus practically immune from
court-martial jurisdiction. 6 ' The jurisdiction conferred by article
to orders so specifying-as is the practice of the Navy-refusal to accept them might
entail, as in the LaPlata case, an order to 45 days of active training, which would
certainly subject him to the Code. See Wren, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Naval

Reservists, 17 JAG J. 5, 6 (1963).
164 Traffic offenses, which are, of course, the ordinary citizen's ordinary crime,
would not normally be covered, for the reservist is not considered to be engaged in
inactive duty training while driving to and from the drill. Cf. O'Brien v. United
States, 192 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1951).
165"Subdivision 3, article 2, was objected to by Reserve associations on the
ground that it would be used to subject Reserves to the code when they are engaged
in all types of inactive duty training. Although the committee has made no change
in this subdivision, it desires to express the view that military departments should
issue orders subjecting Reserves to the code only when they are engaged in inactive
duty training involving the use of dangerous or expensive equipment." S. REP. No.

486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, 7 (1949) ; see H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
4-5 (1949); 96 CONG. REc. 1356-57 (1949). The House committee report did not

stress the limitation to "dangerous or expensive" equipment, and it is hard to see
why the Senate, if it so construed the provision, did not insist on unambiguous language.
The Senators may have been deterred by the near-impossibility of defining "dangerous
or expensive."
166 See note 157 supra; Wren, supra note 163, at 18.
167 Prior to the Uniform Code, the Navy had jurisdiction over retired reservists,
who were on the same retired list as the regulars. The Code standardized jurisdiction
over such personnel by virtually abolishing it in all three services. See S. REP. No.

486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10
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2 (6) over members of the Fleet Reserve and the Fleet Marine Corps
Reserve (categories peculiar to the Navy) is presumably at least as
constitutional as that over retired regulars, to whom they bear a
stronger generic resemblance than to ordinary reservists. 68 But this
subsection also appears at the present time to be a moribund, if not
dead, letter. Although article 2(6), like its predecessor, 69 in terms
applies to Fleet Reservists as such, whether or not on active duty, the
Navy seems for some reason to have supposed that recall to active
duty was a prerequisite to the military trial of a Fleet Reservist. 7 '
Necessary or not, this practice was dealt a crippling, if not fatal, blow
in United States ex rel. Boscola v. Bledsoe and its companion case,
United States ex rel. Smith v. Thomas.' 71 In these cases, the Navy,
probably motivated by considerations akin to those which led to the
courts-martial of Hooper and Chambers, recalled a retired enlisted
man and a Fleet Reservist to active duty for the sole purpose of courtmartialing them for offenses committed after their active service had
ended and for which, into the bargain, they had already been tried,
convicted, and punished by a state court.'72 The district court, re(1949). The District Court for the District of Columbia recently rejected an argument that such discrimination rendered unconstitutional the retained jurisdiction over
retired regulars. Taussig v. McNamara, 219 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1963).
168 They are composed of regular naval or marine enlisted men, who after 20 years
or more of active service are transferred to the Fleet or Marine Corps Reserve until
retired, and who receive a substantial percentage of the base pay of their grade as
"retainer pay." See 10 U.S.C. § 6330-32 (1958).
Their closest analogues in the
other services are retired enlisted men who are also members of the Reserve. See
United States ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno, 76 F. Supp. 203, 207 (D. Conn. 1947), aff'd,
167 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.), cert. granted and thereafter dismissed by stipulation of counsel,
335 U.S. 806 (1948) (upholding jurisdiction over a Fleet Reservist largely on the
analogy of United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244 (1881)); see text accompanying
note 137 supra; 10 U.S.C. §§ 3914, 8914 (1958).
169 The Naval Reserve Act of 1938 provided that members of the Fleet Reserve,
like retired personnel, should "at all times be subject to the laws, regulations and
orders for the government of the Navy." Ch. 690, § 6, 52 Stat. 1175.
170 See United States ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno, 167 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted and thereafter dismissed by stipulation of counsel, 335 U.S. 806 (1948);
Wren, supra note 163, at 17; Everett, Persons Who Can Be Tried by Court-Martial,
5 J. PUB. L. 148, 149 n.12 (1956). The notion seems inconsistent with the reasoning
by which the Court of Military Appeals reached the conclusion that a retired regular
may be court-martialed under article 2(4) without having first been placed on active
duty. United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 641, 26 C.M.R. 417, 421 (1958);
see text accompanying note 109 supra..
171 152 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Wash. 1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1957).
Boscola was on the retired list; Smith, whose case was in all other respects similar,
was a7 member
of the Fleet Reserve. The two cases were decided on identical grounds.
2
1 Boscola and Smith did not endear the Navy to the American Legion, whose
usual enthusiasm for a strong defense establishment does not extend to the courtmartialing of veterans. The Legion's Special Committee on the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and the United States Court of Military Appeals characterized
them in terms described by the Committee itself as "temperate," but which may not
have struck the Navy in that light: "As examples of immaturity (to be temperate
in expression) and lack of independence of Naval legal advisers we cite the decision
of the United States District Court . . . in the Boscola and Smith cases, wherein
is demonstrated the exercise of illegal, capricious and arbitrary power at its worst."
See Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel 424.
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leasing the petitioners from naval custody (neither had been actually
brought to trial) on the ground that the kind of "duty" for which the
statute in question ' 73 authorized recall was not intended by Congress
to include standing trial, never reached the construction or the constitutionality of subsections (4) or (6) of article 2. There is an earlier,
substantially conflicting, decision of the Second Circuit in United States
ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno,17 4 which upheld the recall and court-martial
conviction of a Fleet Reservist for an offense committed after his
release from active duty. But since its failure in Boscola and Smith,
the Navy has made no effort to court-martial Fleet or Marine Corps
Reservists. For one thing, the statutes under which Pasela, Boscola,
and Smith were put on active duty are applicable only in time of war
or national emergency. For another, the cumulative effect of the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari (subsequently dismissed by stipulation of counsel) in Pasela, the trend of its decisions in Toth and in
other cases discussed at the beginning of this Article, and the Boscola
decision itself may well have made the earlier precedent too rickety to
bear the weight of a hard case. In the Hooper and Chambers cases,
the naval authorities made no effort to order the accused to active
duty, relying wholly on the direct grant of jurisdiction contained in
article 2(4)Y7 Whether the results thus far attained in the Hooper
case will encourage the Navy to apply to Fleet Reservists under article
2(6) the arguments which succeeded with retired persounel under
2 (4) is doubtful; there are, after all, other and less controversial ways
of eliminating undesirables from the Reserve, if not from the retired
list.
Thus, the several provisions of the Uniform Code which explicitly
subject reservists not on active duty to court-martial, though broad
enough to create a military jurisdiction of alarming extent over
hundreds of thousands or millions of quasi-civilians-if the military
were so inclined and if the courts took the statutory language literallyare not likely to present civilian judges with serious problems. The
services, even the Navy, have small reason and less desire to stir up
the American Legion, the Reserve Officers Association, and all the
173 10 U.S.C. § 6482 (1958).
174 167 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.), cert. granted and thereafter dismissed by stipulation
of counsel, 335 U.S. 806 (1948). The court in Boscola distinguished Pasela on the
strength of not very significant differences in the wording of the statute under which
Pasela had been put on active duty, but its disagreement with the Second Circuit's
reasoning is hardly concealed. 152 F. Supp. at 345-46.
175Admiral Hooper's counsel argued vigorously and unsuccessfully that the
Admiral could not be tried unless he was on active duty at the time of the trial; they
attributed the Navy's failure to recall him to Boscola. See Brief on Behalf of the
Accused, pp. 9, 13, United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417
(1958) ; text accompanying note 109 ripra.
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other hornets' nests, by using their scarce legal personnel to try
offenses which in all save the rarest cases can be handled by a combination of civilian criminal justice and military administrative
procedures.
It may thus be concluded with reasonable assurance that reservists
will not, and probably cannot, be court-martialed for offenses committed when they are not on active duty. There remains the problem
under article 3 (a) of the reservist who, while on active duty, commits
an offense which is a serious violation of the Code (punishable by five
years' confinement) and not triable by an American civilian court
(either because it is purely military or because it was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any American court),176 but who is
not charged therewith before his separation from active duty. If he
is honorably discharged and wholly separated from the service, he is,
of course, constitutionally immune from military jurisdiction.1 77 But
suppose, as is likely to be the case, he is not discharged, but transferred to the Reserve? " Is he any more vulnerable than Toth? If
he is, article 3 (a) may still retain substantial life.
As a matter of fact, the original version of article 3(a) was
intended to recall to active duty for disciplinary purposes reservists who
had reverted to inactive status. The loud complaints of reserve groups
led Congress to broaden the section's coverage of persons and to limit
the offenses covered." 9 Congress was at the time, as the hearings and
committee reports on the Uniform Code reveal, much exercised by the
possibility, recently and graphically demonstrated, that under the
existing Articles of War and Articles for the Government of the Navy,
a soldier or sailor could commit a serious crime outside the jurisdiction of the civilian courts of the United States, conceal it until his
release from service, and thereafter thumb his nose at the law. One
such case was that of Captain Kathleen Nash Durant, who had stolen
the crown jewels of Hesse and been brought to justice only because her
terminal leave had not quite expired when the Army finally got the
176 The Court of Military Appeals recently held, for example, that article 3(a)
was inapplicable to larcenies of government property and forgeries of documents for
the purpose of defrauding the Government, though committed in Japan, because it
concluded that the sections of the Penal Code denouncing such felonies had extraterritorial application, and that the accused could thus have been tried in a federal
district court. United States v. Steidley, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 108, 33 C.M.R. 320 (1963)
cf. Martin v. Young, 134 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
177 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) ; see text accompanying note 1 supra.
178 The ordinary draftee, after completing his active duty, is transferred to the
Ready Reserve and thereafter to the Standby Reserve for the balance of his military

obligation. 10 U.S.C. §§ 267-73 (1958) ; Note, 69 YALE L.J. 474 (1960).

179 See Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 567, 617, 882-84 (1949) ; H. REP. No 491,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949).
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goods on her.18
Another was the Hirshberg case,""' in which the
Supreme Court finally decided that, under the statutes antedating the
Uniform Code, a sailor who had been honorably discharged could not,
though he reenlisted the next day, be court-martialed for offenses
(other than frauds on the United States) committed during the first
enlistment-a point on which there had been much inconclusive debate,
although the Army ever since 1862 and the Navy until 1932 had taken
the position that such jurisdiction did not survive an honorable discharge."
For this purpose, the courts saw no significant difference
between an outright discharge and transfer to the inactive reserve.183
Congress could, of course, have plugged the jurisdictional loophole by
increasing the number of offenses over which the federal courts have
extraterritorial jurisdiction; it elected instead to preserve court-martial
jurisdiction over such serious offenses as were, under the existing laws,
beyond the reach of the civilian courts.
Toth showed that choice to have been a constitutional blunder
in the case of the serviceman who has "severed all relationship with the
military and its institutions." "4 It has, however, since been held
that article 3(a) is constitutional when applied to a discharged
offender who renews his connection with the military and its institutions by signing up for another hitch, and who thus is subject to the
Code both when he commits the offense and when the Military Police
180 Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F.2d 288 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 818
(1948). The court held that although Captain Durant was required to perform no
duty during her terminal leave, at the expiration of which she would automatically
have been relieved from active duty, she was nonetheless on active duty until that
expiration. She would have retained her commission, and thus have had some connection with the armed forces, until six months after the end of the emergency, but
the court's holding made it unnecessary to consider whether she could have been
recalled from inactive status in order to stand trial. 168 F.2d at 293-94. The accused's
husband, Colonel Durant, whose romance blossomed from their common interest in
the collection of historic gems, stayed in jail for the same reasons. Durant v. Hiatt,
81 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
181 United States cx rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949), reversing
United States cx rel Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, 168 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1948).
182 The problem is discussed, and the conflicting authorities collected, in the
opinions in United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, supra note 181, at 507-08,
and Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F.2d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
818 (1948). See generally 31 Ops. Ar'y GEN. 521 (1919) ; Zeigler, The Termination
of Jurisdiction Over the Person and the Offense, Military L. Rev., Oct. 1960, pp. 139,
144. At least one district court and the Court of Military Appeals have recognized
an exception to the general rule (also recognized before the enactment of the Uniform Code) in the case of a "short" discharge--i.e., one conditioned upon immediate
reenlistment or acceptance of a commission, so that there is no real interruption or
civilian "hiatus" in the accused's status of subjection to the Code. United States
ex reL. Atkinson v. Kish, 176 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Pa. 1959) ; United States v. Johnson,
6 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 20 C.M.R. 36 (1955); United States v. Solinsky, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 153,
7 C.M.R. 29 (1953); cf. United States v. Martin, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 636, 28 C.M.R. 202
(1959).
183 United States ex reL Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920);
United States ex rel. Santantonio v. Warden, 265 Fed. 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1919) ; United
States v. Brown, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 693, 31 C.M.R. 279 (1962).
184 350 U.S. at 14.
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catch up with him-apparently without regard to the length of the
8 6
civilian interlude between the two periods.18 In Atkinson v. Kish,"
the accused had been conditionally discharged for the purpose of
'allowing him to sign up for a fresh term of enlistment and so, under
the "no hiatus" rule, was held to have remained subject to military
jurisdiction without benefit of article 3 (a), although the court did not
rely on this ground alone. But in United States v. Gallagher,' the
defendant's term of enlistment had expired; like Hirshberg, he was
free, and would have been well advised, to kiss the service a permanent
goodby. These cases involved regulars, whose habit it is to reenlist.
Whether their reasoning can be extended to an inactive reservist-who
retains only the minimum military status required by the statute, and
who normally cannot be ordered to active duty without his consent, or
for the sole purpose of being court-martialed-is very doubtful, despite
the case of Airman Third Class Wheeler. 8
Wheeler, though not a lawyer, took pains to present the courts
with a set of facts which might have been dreamed up by a Professor
of Military Law. First, he committed a rather picturesque murder
while on active duty in Germany, thoughtfully selecting a time when
he was about to return to the United States for release from active
duty. Having failed to mention the murder to his superiors, he was
within a few days duly transferred to the inactive Reserve to complete
his military obligation. He proceeded to find a civilian job and
generally to assimilate himself as closely to a full-fledged civilian, on
the model of Mr. Toth, as was possible without actually being discharged. But murder will out, and this one did. Some five months
later, Wheeler, having been "contacted" and questioned by both the
Air Force's Office of Special Investigations and the civilian police of
'Pensacola, Florida, freely confessed to both of them. At this point
legal problems began to bedevil the authorities, for it was plain that
neither the federal nor the state courts could try Wheeler for a murder,
committed in Wiesbaden and having no element of espionage, treason,
or any other extraterritorial offense. The cooperative civilian police
gained a breathing space for the lawyers by resorting to the device of
arresting Wheeler for vagrancy and holding him for investigation.
Article 3 (a) was, of course, applicable in terms, for the offense was
punishable by more than five years and triable by no American court8

1 5 United

States ex rel. Atkinson v. Kish, 176 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Pa. 1959);
United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957); cf. United
States v. Frayer, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 600, 29 C.M.R. 416 (1960).
186 176 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Pa. 1959).
187

7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).

188 Wheeler v. Reynolds, 164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958); United States v.
Wheeler, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 28 C.M.R. 212 (1959).
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but there stood the Toth decision. The Air Force lawyers seem to
have preferred not to rest their whole case on the argument that
Wheeler could be distinguished from Toth simply because he was still
in the Reserve; like their colleagues in the Navy, they thought it
better to put him on active duty before trying him. This raised more
obstacles. In the first place, Wheeler could not be recalled to active
duty without his consent except in time of war or national emergency; "s in the second place, Air Force Regulations forbade a recall
for the purpose of court-martial. 9 ' The Secretary of the Air Force
and Wheeler cooperated to remove these difficulties. The Secretary
consented to, and indeed ordered, Wheeler's "apprehension, return to
military control and trial by court-martial," 191 and Wheeler obligingly applied for active duty. His motivation seems to have been
intense fear of extradition and trial by a German court. Parenthetically, it may be remarked that his alarm was not only excessive, but
also legally unsound, for it was in fact very doubtful that he could
have been extradited under the applicable treaty with Germany.'9 2 It
is still more doubtful that Germany would have been considered
"occupied" or "under the control of" the United States for the purpose
of the statute which authorizes extradition to such territories.193 At
any rate, he volunteered for active duty, not merely willingly, but
downright eagerly, for the solitary purpose of being tried by a courtmartial.' 94
Wheeler, like Hooper and Chambers, had both civilian and military
courts pass upon his case. His enthusiasm for court-martial seems to
have been dispelled by perusal of the actual charges against him189 10 U.S.C. §§ 672-73 (1958).
190 21 Fed. Reg. 5015 (1956).
191 Whether this action of the Secretary was sufficient to dissipate the effect of
his own regulation and legitimize the orders putting Wheeler on active duty is
debatable. Cf. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) ; United States ex rel. Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). The point was not considered in the subsequent
attacks on the court-martial's jurisdiction, even by those judges who upheld that
jurisdiction solely on the basis of Wheeler's return to active duty.
192 Extradition Treaty With Germany, July 12, 1930, 47 Stat. 1862, T.S. No. 836;
cf. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) (holding that an
American citizen was not covered by the similarly worded Franco-American extradition treaty).
193 18 U.S.C. § 3185 (1958) ; In the Matter of Kraussman, 130 F. Supp. 926 (D.
Conn. 1955).
194 [W]hile still in the Pensacola jail, petitioner [Wheeler] executed a formapplication for extended active duty within the Air Force, after the officer
who presented the same to him for signature, told him to read a statement
therein to the effect that, upon his recall to active duty, he would be confronted immediately with court-martial charges, and explained such statement
to him also. According to this officer, petitioner's desire to execute such
application was so great that the officer restrained him from signing it until
he was assured that petitioner was doing so entirely voluntarily.
164 F. Supp. at 953.
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though the convening authority, possibly having in mind the Frankfurter-Harlan distinction in Covert and Krueger,95 had directed that
the case be treated as noncapital. He promptly sought habeas corpus,
principally on the ground that his release from active duty had brought
him within the shelter of Toth.'96 The court held otherwise, and did
so without reference to the fact that Wheeler was on active duty at
the time he was charged.
[B]y reason of his military obligation and reserve status,
however inactive or limited it may be, for the military purposes intended by Congress to be served by the creation and
maintenance of the present reserve components of the armed
forces, petitioner, when released from active duty, was not
a full-fledged civilian, nor in the same status as a discharged
veteran but was an Airman Third Class of the Air Force
Reserve.1 9T
So far as the Florida district court was concerned, the Air Force
could have spared itself the elaborate maneuvers by which Wheeler
was placed on active duty, for, since every reservist is ipso facto a part
of the land or naval forces, article 3(a) could constitutionally subject
him to military jurisdiction.
The Court of Military Appeals, though it reached the same result,
was less clear. Only Judge Latimer followed the reasoning of the
civilian court, stressing that since reservists are intimately connected
with the military, likely to be called to the colors "almost at the scratch
of the Presidential pen," their amenability to military justice (at least
for crimes committed on active duty) is necessary "in order to maintain orderly and disciplined fighting forces and to keep them in good
public repute . . . . Not only do unpunished criminals bring [the
armed forces] . . . into disrepute and lower the prestige of the
Nation, they impair morale and discipline in the services." 198 The
trouble with this line of argument, of course, is that it simply sidesteps the basic objection of the Supreme Court in Toth: the problem
in each situation is not whether the criminal ought to be brought to
trial, but whether that trial ought to be in a civilian court. From this
standpoint, the difference between the inactive reservist who receives
neither training nor pay, and whose military value is no greater than
that of any other former soldier of his age, and the discharged veteran
195 See text accompanying note 53 supra.

196 He claimed also that his recall to active duty was void because involuntary
and unauthorized by Air Force regulations. 164 F. Supp. at 954. The court's holding
made it unnecessary to pass on either point.
197 164 F. Supp. at 955.
198 10 U.S.C.M.A. at 655-56, 28 C.M.R. at 221-22.
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who is a potential draftee in time of emergency seems hardly great
enough to justify a constitutional distinction. Nor is there much
more force in the argument that the services ought to be able to purge
their Reserves of murderers, rapists, thieves, and other felons. No
doubt they should, but, as is not the case with retired personnel, they
can easily take care of that by administrative discharges. It is true, as
Judge Latimer pointed out, that they may "end up with a military
record which can be clouded with nothing more than an administrative
discharge." ' That consideration seems a good deal less than overpowering. The inactive reservist, unlike the retired regular, is not
likely to be identified by the public with the military service; he
typically sports neither his rank nor his uniform, and certainly could
not do so after an administrative discharge. An administrative undesirable discharge, furthermore, is not exactly a badge of honor; it is
in reality a large black cloud on the recipient's military record, in
practice nearly as damaging as a strictly punitive discharge. And,
after all, Toth wound up with a perfectly good honorable discharge,
suitable for framing.
The other members of the Court of Military Appeals, perhaps for
some of the foregoing reasons, sought other grounds on which to base
the decision. Their view was that article 3(a) was constitutional in
the circumstances because Wheeler, despite a civilian hiatus of some
five months, was on active duty when he was tried, a circumstance
which had already been held sufficient to distinguish Toth. Chief
Judge Quinn expressed no opinion "as to the continuation of courtmartial jurisdiction under Article 3(a) of the Code over individuals
relieved from active duty and transferred to a reserve component for
completion of a military service obligation under the Universal Military Training Act." 200 Judge Ferguson stated: "I completely disassociate myself from the conclusion of the principal opinion that . . .
Article 3(a) may be constitutionally utilized as the basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction over a member of the reserve forces not on
active duty for an offense committed while he was on active duty." 201
One thing is clear. The next soldier who manages to conceal a
serious crime, committed outside the jurisdiction of American civil
courts, until he has been released from active duty and transferred to
the inactive Reserve will present military lawyers with perplexing problems. He probably cannot be put on active service without his consent, and, if he is well advised, he will not simplify those problems by
Id. at 656, 28 C.M.R. at 222.
Id. at 658, 28 C.M.R. 225.
201
Id. at 659, 28 C.M.R. 225.
199

200
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volunteering for active duty. Even if he does, it is not at all certain
that a court of appeals or the Supreme Court would distinguish Toth
for that reason. The reasoning of Gallagher, that the maintenance of
discipline requires power to court-martial a soldier presently on active
duty for a crime committed in a previous tour of duty, looks somewhat
strained and artificial when the sole "duty" he is expected to perform
during the second period is to play the leading role in a general courtmartial, and the exclusive reason for his presence among the active
land and naval Forces is the attempted legitimization of that courtmartial.
If he cannot by force or persuasion be put on active service, the
sailing is still less smooth. Judge Ferguson of the Court of Military
Appeals is of the unequivocal opinion that article 3(a) cannot constitutionally be applied to one who has no more connection with the
military than membership in the inactive Reserve. The views of Chief
Judge Quinn and Judge Latimer's successor, Judge Kilday, are unknown. Even if both of them agree with Judge Latimer and the
Florida district court, I greatly doubt that their reasoning would
carry conviction to a federal appellate court-particularly the Supreme
Court.
I come thus to the opinion that a reservist, as such, is immune
from court-martial jurisdiction, and ought to be. If justice requires
his punishment, he is, or can be made, triable in the civilian courts.
If military efficiency requires his elimination from the service, that can
be done by methods easier, less drastic, and less questionable from the
constitutional standpoint than a court-martial.
IV.

COURT-MARTIAL

JURISDICTION
IN

OVER

DISCHARGED

PRISONERS

MILITARY CUSTODY

There remains to be considered a rather populous class of quasicivilians, by definition criminally inclined. These are prisoners serving court-martial sentences in disciplinary barracks and similar military
jails, who are subjected to the Code by article 2(7).2°0 No constitutional problem arises, of course, if the convict has not been sentenced
to discharge, or if higher authority, hopeful of rehabilitation, has suspended the execution of the discharge. A soldier does not cease to be
a soldier simply because he is deprived of his pay and liberty. But if
a punitive discharge, pursuant to the court-martial's sentence, has been
executed, the recipient undoubtedly takes on a certain resemblance
to Mr. Toth. A discharge, though it be yellow in color, labelled
202 The exact language of the subsection is "Persons in custody of the armed
forces serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial."
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'dishonorable" in large type, and bereft equally of fancy engraving,
spread-eagles, and statutory benefits, is nonetheless a discharge. By
itself, it terminates military jurisdiction just as efficaciously as an
honorable discharge."'
But the execution of a punitive discharge does not necessarily
"wholly sever" the convict's relationship with the armed forces, for
he may retain an intimate connection with the military through its
penal system. Though he has neither rank nor pay, he is fed and
clothed by the service; he is subject to its disciplinary regulations,
which typically prescribe a certain amount of military training; and he
is under the orders of the resident staff and faculty, who are military
personnel. If he is a civilian, he is assuredly a peculiar variety of that
species.
Congress has certainly never regarded the military prisoner as a
full-fledged civilian; court-martial jurisdiction over him is as old as
the military prison system itself, which dates from 1873.204 It has survived every subsequent revision of the military penal code, including
the Uniform Code itself. The only significant change has been a return
to the original policy of limiting military jurisdiction to those who are
confined not only pursuant to sentence of a court-martial but also in a
military prison. 0 The courts have been afforded plenty of opportunities to consider
the validity of these provisions, for the persons thus subjected to military law are by definition full of criminal propensities. Moreover, even
in the pre-Toth era, military convicts were aware that their discharges
put them on a somewhat different footing from ordinary members of
the armed forces. Though Winthrop thought a discharged soldier a
civilian, constitutionally exempt from court-martial, 206 nineteenth century courts made short work of the constitutional argument, for it
203 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL [ 11, at 14 (1951);
Zeigler, The Termination of Jurisdiction Over the Person and the Offense, Military
L. Rev., Oct. 1960, pp. 139, 144. For this purpose there is no distinction between the
dishonorable discharge and the theoretically slightly less punitive bad-conduct discharge. Cf. United States v. Nelson, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 93, 33 C.M.R. 305 (1963).
204
Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 249, § 1, 17 Stat. 582. During the Civil War the
Army managed to get along with an ill-assorted collection of penological tools which
included short-term confinement in regimental stockades or guardhouses, capital punishment, a rich variety of picturesque corporal punishments (e.g., shaving the offender's
head, causing him to wear a barrel or derogatory placard), most of which would
today be regarded as unusual, if not cruel, remission to the civil authorities, and punitive discharges (which frequently failed to prevent reenlistment under another name).
See H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 61, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1870); WINTHROP 437-42.
205 Act of June 18, 1898, ch. 418, 30 Stat 483-84, unlike the Act of 1873, was not
in terms limited to those confined in military prisons, and neither were the corresponding provisions in the Articles of War of 1916, 1920, and 1948. See Act of Aug. 29,
1916, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 650-51; Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 787; Act of June

24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 628.
206 WINTHROP 105-07.
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seemed clear to them that military prisoners, discharge or no discharge,
were far from having severed their connection with the Army." 7 As
one of them said, drawing a stirring picture of a gallant martial
hoosegow:
The prison in question [the disciplinary barracks at
Fort Leavenworth] was designed as a place of punishment
for those persons only who, while in the military service of
the government

. .

.

are guilty of offenses "against the rules,

regulations and laws for the government of the army of the
United States." It is a part of our military establishment,
as much as the guardhouse, with which our forts and military
encampments are always provided. .

.

.

There can be no

doubt of the fact that the prison was thus placed in charge of
army officers because it was regarded as a military institution, the same as a fort or an arsenal or a navy yard, and
for the purpose of subjecting persons who might be confined
therein to military law and to the same discipline that is enforced in the army.
[T]he discharge was issued in part execution of
a sentence which directed that he should not only be dishonorably discharged, with the forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, but that he should also be held and confined at
hard labor for a given period in a military prison. A discharge executed under these circumstances and for such a
purpose cannot be said to have had the effect of severing his
connection with the army, and of freeing him forthwith from
all the restraints of military law. 0 '
The Supreme Court a few years later went out of its way to state
that Captain Oberlin Carter, probably the all-time champion military
litigant, "was a military prisoner though he had ceased to be a soldier;
and for offenses committed during his confinement he was liable to
trial and punishment by court-martial under the rules and articles of
war." 20 9 But the declaration was not much more than dictum, for
Carter's hairsplitting argument-in substance, that when the court
began its sentence by dismissing him he ceased eo instante to be an
officer of the Army, so that the remaining clauses of the sentence were
vainly addressed to an immune civilian-hardly required such a rebuttal. Aside from the common-sense rejoinder that all the com20
7 Ex parte Wildman, 29 Fed. Cas. 1232 (No. 17653a) (D. Kan. 1876) ; In re
Craig, 70 Fed. 969 (C.C.D. Kan. 1895). The Attorney General came to the same
conclusion. 16 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 292 (1879).
208In re Craig, 70 Fed. 969, 971 (C.C.D. Kan. 1895).
209 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 383 (1902). For an account of Captain
Carter's long series of collateral attacks, extending over nearly forty years, on his
court-martial conviction, see the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 846 (1953).
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ponents of the sentence were concurrent, Carter's offense had been
committed while he was admittedly on active service, and the point
could be disposed of on the authority of the well-settled principle that
court-martial jurisdiction, having once validly attached, lasts until
the process of military justice is completed. Not until 1921 did the
Supreme Court squarely face the problem in Kahn v. Anderson,1 0 a
case in which dishonorably discharged prisoners in the disciplinary
barracks were convicted by court-martial of murder committed while
they were in that status. To be precise, it was not quite clear that the
prisoners' dishonorable discharges had actually been executed before
they committed the murder, but the Court assumed this to be the case.
Proceeding on this assumption, it held unanimously that, "as they
remained military prisoners, they were for that reason subject to
military law and trial by court-martial for offenses committed during
such imprisonment." 211 Some of Chief Justice White's language
comes close to suggesting that he and his brethren in 1921 thought that
Congress was constitutionally empowered to subject anyone at all to
court-martial, the only question being one of interpretation of its
intent:
[W] e observe that a further contention, that, conceding
the accused to have been subject to military law, they could
not be tried because Congress was without power so to provide consistently with the guarantees as to jury trial and
presentment or indictment by grand jury, respectively secured
by Art. I, § 8, [Art. III, § 2] of the Constitution, and Art. V
[and Art. VI] of the Amendments [sic],-is also without
foundation, since it directly denies the existence of a power
in Congress exerted from the beginning, and disregards the
numerous decisions of this court by which its exercise has
been sustained ....
If this was really the basis of the opinion-remembering that none
of the "numerous decisions" to which the Court referred had dealt
with the court-martial of a pure civilian-it was, of course, destroyed
by the Court's recent opinions in Toth, Covert, and the rest of the cases
210255 U.S. 1 (1921).

255 U.S. at 7-8. The Court cited and quoted from Carter v. McClaughry,
183 U.S. 365 (1902). It also held that, although the trial had taken place a few days
after the Armistice, it was not precluded by the provision of article 92 of the 1916
Articles of War that "no person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape
committed within the geographical limits of the states of the Union and the District
of Columbia in time of peace." That phrase, the Court said, meant "peace in the
complete sense, officially declared." 255 U.S. at 10. This part of the decision was
virtually overruled by Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959). The Court in Lee
observed the judicial amenities by labeling as "dictum" the phrase quoted from Kahn
v. Anderson.
212 255 U.S. at 8.
211
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holding that Congress cannot constitutionally subject a civilian to
military law in peacetime.
At the time, however, Kahn seemed to have disposed of the
problem; the few courts in which the problem was raised dutifully and
unquestioningly upheld military jurisdiction over discharged prisoners. 13 All this seeming certainty was, of course, rudely unsettled by
Toth, which made it clear, first, that there were constitutional barriers
to the proliferation of court-martial jurisdiction and, second, that one
of those barriers was an effective separation from the military community, such as a discharge.2 14 Hope woke again in the breasts of
all the dishonorably discharged prisoners whose stay in jail had been
lengthened by the addition of a new court-martial sentence for an
offense committed while serving a prior sentence. The first such twotime loser to reach the federal courthouse was one John Lee. Lee,
while serving twenty years in a disciplinary barracks for robbery and
assault, pursuant to a court-martial sentence which also included an
executed dishonorable discharge, conspired to commit murder, was
duly convicted thereof by a general court-martial, and sentenced to
death, commuted to life imprisonment. The Army, abandoning the
idea of rehabilitation, designated Alcatraz as the place of confinement. 213 In 1956 the Army's Clemency Board, in an apparently empty

act of grace, remitted the balance of the original sentence-whose
validity Lee could not well contest 2 1 6 -with the result that his continued sojourn in Alcatraz was supported only by the second sentence,
inflicted after his discharge, and also at a time when the United States
was only technically at war with Germany and Japan. His petition
for habeas corpus attacked the validity of the conviction on both
grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected both
contentions, on the authority of Kahn v. Anderson. "Time of peace"
meant peace officially declared; and as to the constitutional point, it
could not see that Toth or the other civilian cases had changed the
situation at all, for Lee's "relationship to the military . . .was close
213 McDonald v. Lee, 217 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. granted and remanded
with instructions to dismiss as moot, 349 U.S. 948 (1955) ; Mosher v. Hunter, 143
F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 800 (1945); Mosher v. Hudspeth,
123 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 670 (1942) ; Steele v. Humphrey,
80 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
214 The Supreme Court in Toth briefly summarized Kahn, without expressing
approval or disapproval, though it did distinguish discharged prisoners from "civilian
ex-soldiers who had severed all relationship with the military and its institutions."
350 U.S. at 14.
215 Under article 58(a) "a sentence of confinement adjudged by a court-martial
may be carried into execution by confinement in any place of confinement under
the control of any of the armed forces or in any penal or correctional institution
under the control of the United States . .. ."
2 16

Cf. Lee v. Swope, 225 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1955).
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and continuing; in Toth, Covert, and Krueger, the relationship was
non-existent." 217 The Supreme Court reversed, but solely on the
ground that June 10, 1949, was "time of peace" within the meaning
of the prohibition in former Article of War 92. The majority thus
never reached the constitutional issue, though it based its strict construction of the article on the general philosophy, exemplified by Toth
and Covert, that military jurisdiction ought to be confined as narrowly
as possible-a philosophy which Justice Black generously attributed
to Congress (or at least to the Congress of 1920, for the Uniform Code
permits courts-martial to try capital crimes in peacetime) as well as
the Court. The dissenters, Justices Harlan and Clark, found no more
merit in Lee's second contention than in his first: "this contention is
also squarely foreclosed by Kahn v. Anderson . . . and . . .nothing
in [Toth or Covert] . . . impairs the authority of Kahn on this

score." 218
Lee v. Madigan,219 if it did not directly help prisoners who had
been tried and convicted after dishonorable discharge, at least was not
written in tones calculated to discourage them, and others pressed
forward to attack what seemed to be a weak spot in the prison walls.
Roland Simcox, a dishonorably discharged military prisoner, had
accumulated no less than three additional court-martial sentences before
the Army gave up and shipped him to Alcatraz. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit refused to release him, on the strength of Kahn
v. Anderson and its own opinion in Lee v. Madigan.220 But two of
the three judges concurred "with some reluctance"; they were personally unable to reconcile the rationale of Toth with Kahn v. Anderson
or their own holding, but they thought it better judicial etiquette to
leave to the Supreme Court the overruling of the Kahn case. But that
Court ignored the engraved invitation to grant certiorari. Simcox
remained in Alcatraz.
The Court of Military Appeals, since the Supreme Court's anticlimactic disposition of the Simcox case, has grappled with the question and come to the conclusion that article 2 (7) is constitutional 221_
although Judge Ferguson, like the concurring judges in the Ninth
Circuit, would have had "grave doubts" if the Supreme Court had not
chosen to leave Kahn v. Anderson standing.22 The majority's prin217 Lee v. Madigan, 248 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd 358 U.S. 228 (1959);
accord, Ragan v. Cox, 320 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1963).

218 358 U.S. at 241.
219 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
220 Simcox v. Madigan, 298 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964

(1962).

221 United States v. Nelson, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 93, 33 C.M.R. 305 (1963); United
States v. Ragan, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 33 C.M.R. 331 (1963).
2=2

14 U.S.C.M.A. at 96, 33 C.M.R. at 308.
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cipal ground seems to have been that the dishonorable discharge of
one who is thereafter to remain in military custody, though that
discharge be executed, is incomplete and conditional only, until the
recipient has actually returned to the civilian community. "A prisoner
serving the confinement part of his sentence in a military prison is
not in the position of Toth. He is not part of the civilian community
and has not 'severed all relationship with the military and its institutions.'

.

.

.

The effect of his discharge is expressly conditioned by,

and subject to, the provisions of Article 2 (7) of the Uniform Code." 22
The weakness of this piece of dialectic is that it could almost as easily
have been applied to the effect of article 3 (a) on honorably discharged
soldiers-that Congress intended them to be given discharges conditioned on their having committed no crimes of the sort specified, and
incomplete to the extent that the veteran was still "in" the service for
the purposes of the article. Indeed, Justices Minton and Burton, citing
Kahn v. Anderson, reasoned in exactly that fashion in Toth, without
attracting support from their brethren.22
The Supreme Court is certain to have further opportunities to pass
on the question, for many tenacious and durable litigants, prone to
recurring court-martial trouble, are in a position to raise it.2 25 If and
2

Id. at 94, 33 C.M.R. at 306. The same argument, that Congress intended the
discharged prisoner to continue "in" the service until his release from confinement,
was elaborated in the Government's brief in Lee. See Brief for the Respondent, pp.
29-32, Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959). It finds a degree of support in the
legislative history of some of the predecessors of article 2(7). "Furthermore, he
should not be treated as absolutely discharged . . . [from] the service until his
term of imprisonment has expired. Dishonorable discharge, being a part of the
sentence, ought not to be held to take full effect until the expiration of his term of
imprisonment, although the sentence would operate as a forfeiture of all pay and
allowances." H.R. REP. No. 224, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1898).
He
224 "My trouble is that I don't think Toth was a full-fledged civilian ....
had a conditional discharge only." 350 U.S. at 44.
= E.g., Jack V. K. Ragan, another litigant of Olympic calibre. Ragan, who
must hold some sort of record for recidivism, was court-martialed in 1944 and sentenced to dishonorable discharge and six years; the discharge was suspended, but the
suspension was vacated when he escaped military confinement. After sundry vicissitudes (including several years in a state penitentiary) he was returned to the disciplinary barracks where he demonstrated his distaste for the military life by mutiny
and assault with murderous intent. This time he got ten years and a ticket to Alcatraz. Ragan thereupon managed to inveigle the civilian courts (on the strength of
a somewhat technical argument concerning the applicability of military versus civilian
"good time" regulations) into ordering him returned to the disciplinary barracks.
Having thereby, as the Court of Military Appeals subsequently held, succeeded in
again subjecting himself to the Uniform Code, despite the interlude in the civilian
atmosphere of Alcatraz, he used the opportunity to commit an assault and various
lesser offenses, for which he was awarded another five years. His lively career in
the courts, civil and military, is chronicled in Ragan v. Commandant, 290 F.2d 132
(10th Cir. 1961), cert. granted and case remanded, 369 U.S. 437 (1962) ; Blackwell
v. Edwards, 303 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1962); Ragan v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58 (10th Cir.
1962); Ragan v. Cox, 320 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Ragan, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 119, 33 C.M.R. 331 (1963). In the penultimate case the Tenth Circuit
concluded in habeas corpus proceedings that article 2(7) was constitutional, on the
authority of Kahn v. Anderson. If past performance is any guide, Ragan will seek
certiorari.
2 3
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when the Court elects to tackle the problem again, it may, of course,
simply decide that on balance the petitioner has, or has not, a sufficiently close connection with the military, a sufficient modicum of military status, to be distinguished from Toth. On the other hand, it may
face the issue of whether or not the military authorities have any good
reason for court-martialing discharged prisoners in their custody.
In contrast to retired regulars and reservists, the military in this
case has good reason. The fact that the punitive discharge has been
executed shows that the soldier is a hard case; but the fact that the
Army has chosen not to abandon him to a federal penitentiary shows
that he is not regarded as hopeless. Congress has authorized the
armed forces to make efforts to salvage such problem soldiers. Prisoners in disciplinary barracks, including those with executed discharges,
are organized into disciplinary companies and higher units and receive
infantry training, with a view to "honorable restoration to duty or
reenlistment"; if the discharge has been executed, the Secretary is
empowered, upon the prisoner's written application, to reenlist him
for the balance of his original term.2 2 6 Such rehabilitation legitimately
necessitates subjection to military discipline; for such military offenses
as a prisoner can commit-and he can commit a good many of
them 2 7--a court-martial is the best, and indeed the only, remedy. So
long as the prisoner is regarded as a potential soldier, subject to
military training and discipline for the purpose of military rehabilitation, the same reasons justify his subjection to military law as justified
the creation of a military prison and his incarceration therein. While
it is true that the prisoner whose discharge has been executed cannot,
unlike his cellmate with a suspended discharge, be compelled to finish
his term of enlistment, the advantages of such an opportunity to clear
his record (and get out of jail) are so great that he is unlikely to
refuse them. So long as the Army thinks it worthwhile to keep him
in a disciplinary barracks and under correctional military training, it
226See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3661-63, 8662-63 (1958); Sunday v. Settle, 211 F. Supp.
504, 505 (W.D. Mo. 1962) ; United States v. Nelson, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 93, 95, 33 C.M.R.

305, 307 (1963).

227
Simcox v. Madigan, 298 F.2d 742 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962)
(mutiny); McDonald v. Lee, 217 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. granted and remtanded

with instructions to disiniss as mnoot, 349 U.S. 948 (1955)

(disrespect toward and

offering violence to superior commissioned officer) ; In re Craig, 70 Fed. 969 (C.C.D.
Kan. 1895) (assaulting prison commandant); Ex parte Wildman, 29 Fed. Cas.
1232 (No. 17653a) (D. Kan. 1876) (mutiny); United States v. Nelson, 14 U.S.C.M.A.
93, 33 C.M.R. 305 (1963) (offering violence against a superior commissioned officer) ;
United States v. Ragan, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 33 C.M.R. 331 (1963) (assault on a
military policeman, charged as conduct to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline). On the other hand, the Judge Advocate General of the Army has ruled
that a dishonorably discharged soldier in confinement could not be guilty of absence
without leave or disobeying the orders of a noncommissioned officer. 6 Bull. J.A.G.,
March-April 1947, § 423(1), at 66; 5 Bull. J.A.G., April 1946, § 419(2), at 93.
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has a legitimate reason to subject him to military discipline and law,
and he in turn has a real and substantial connection with the service.
If his offense is essentially civilian-e.g., murder, as in Kahn and
Lee-and triable in the civil courts, a harder question is presented.
It can hardly be argued here that the military need to try him because
his conduct is of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces; in
the first place, the crime normally takes place in the seclusion of the
disciplinary barracks, out of the public eye; and in the second, he is not
held out as an exemplar of military virtue. But his amenability to
court-martial even for these offenses can be defended on most of the
other grounds which are said to justify such jurisdiction in the case
of soldiers on active duty. So long as the accused is susceptible of
honorable restoration to duty, the military can plausibly claim an
interest in him; and until he has been tried it cannot be known whether
he has forfeited that chance and ought to be permanently remitted to
civilian life, beginning with a civilian jail. A civilian court, if it
convicts him, can only sentence him to civilian confinement. But it
may be that the Supreme Court, if it grants certiorari in such a case and
if it gets beyond a mechanical consideration of the prisoner's "status,"
will be led to the conclusion that the diminution of the armed forces'
legitimate need which is effected by the combination of a civilian crime
and a quasi-civilian criminal, means that that trial ought constitutionally to be held according to civilian due process. If he is acquitted,
he will be returned to military control; if he is guilty, it is improbable
that he would in any case have a bright military future.
Finally, even if the Court were to hold that a military prisoner
with an executed dishonorable discharge could not constitutionally be
court-martialed for an offense committed while in that status, there
would abide, as with the Reservist, the question whether he might be
tried for an offense committed prior thereto. What little authority
exists is to the effect that he can-but on the ground that there has
been no "hiatus" in his status of subjection to military law, a ground
which assumes the constitutionality of article 2(7).228 If such continuing jurisdiction were to depend on article 3 (a), the constitutionality
of its application would presumably turn on factors essentially similar
to those which have been discussed in connection with reservists.
V. CONCLUSION

It is apparent that Congress has created, and will doubtless continue to create, a whole menagerie of military-civilian hybrids whose
"status" in relationship to the armed forces defies neat and logical
228

See Zeigler, supra note 182, at 179-80.
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taxonomy. Their capricious creator has made some of them triable by
court-martial, and others not, for reasons which range from antique
traditional to modern political, and which likewise cannot be forced
into an orderly, systematic pattern. The question when and whether
persons who are not soldiers on active duty can constitutionally be
subjected to the miliary version of due process is of prime practical
importance to some such people now, and could easily become of overpowering interest to others. It goes, as the Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized, to the roots of our polity. The courts, and
the Court, can no doubt attempt to solve the problem by attempting
more or less arbitrarily to decide at what point on the military-civilian
spectrum a particular class shades into one community or the other. A
more flexible, though probably more difficult, approach, perhaps better
calculated to reconcile fairness to the man with the legitimate needs of
the military establishment, might be to give more weight to the
"necessary and proper" clause and to consider in each case not merely
the military "status" of the individual, but also the nature, military or
civilian, of the offense involved and the punishment to be inflicted.

